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THE HILL-BURTON ACT, 1946-1980:
ASYNCHRONY IN THE DELIVERY OF
HEALTH CARE TO THE POOR
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, better known as the Hill-Burton
Act, was adopted by Congress in 1946.' The Act, which was the federal
government's first health care initiative,2 was intended to stimulate public and
nonprofit hospital construction and modernization.' The device chosen to attain
this goal was the provision of federal grants to individual hospitals for capital
construction and modernization projects.4 As a condition of funding, recipient
facilities contracted to be available to "all persons residing in the territorial area"
of the facility and to make available "a reasonable volume of hospital services to
persons unable to pay therefor."5 These two obligations have been termed,
respectively, the "community service" and "uncompensated care" components of
the Act.'

1. Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946)
(codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as the Act
or Title VII. In 1975 Congress enacted Title XVI of the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974 to supplant the original Hill-Burton Act. Pub. L. No.
93-641, 88 Stat. 2258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300o-300t (1976)) [hereinafter referred to
as the new Act or Title XVI].
2. Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act:
Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. L. REV. 168, 169 (1975). Prior to Hill-Burton, federal
involvement in health care was limited to the provision of medical services to military
personnel and their dependents. Id.
3. The Congressional Declaration of Purpose of the 1946 Act stated:
The purpose of this title is to assist the several States(a)

to inventory their existing hospitals .

.

. [,J to survey the need for

construction of hospitals, and to develop programs for construction of such public and
other nonprofit hospitals as will, in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the
necessary physical facilities for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and similar
services to all their people; and
(b) to construct public and other nonprofit hospitals in accordance with such
programs.
Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 601, 60 Stat. 1041 (emphasis added) (codified, as amended, at 42
U.S.C. § 291 (1976)). Although Hill-Burton funds also became available to other public and
nonprofit facilities such as out-patient clinics, this Comment focuses on the Act's
application to private, nonprofit in-patient hospitals.
4. Id. § 621, 60 Stat. 1042 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 291a (1976)).
5. Id. § 622(f)(1)-(2), 60 Stat. 1041 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(1)(2) (1976)). The relationship between grantee hospitals and the federal government was
understood by grantees to be contractual, given the government's right of recovery of funds
in certain circumstances. See note 43 infra. The relationship was later held to be
contractual by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Euresti v.
Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 64 infra.
6. These terms will be used throughout this Comment to refer to the Hill-Burton
obligations. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare refers to the "uncompensated services" and "community service" obligations. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.501-.607 (1979).
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For over twenty-five years these obligations remained undefined. The first
regulations drafted under the Act paraphrased the vague statutory terms
without attempting to quantify them.7 It was not until 1970 that indigent
persons who had been denied services at a Hill-Burton hospital filed suit
charging the facility with failing to fulfill its uncompensated care obligation
under the Act.' Subsequent years brought a number of uncompensated care and
community services actions, which, in addition to seeking to compel hospital
treatment of poor people, charged that the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (DHEW), the Act's federal regulatory agency, and various state health
departments, which also had a supervisory role under the Act, had failed to
enforce the hospitals' Hill-Burton obligations. Between 1972 and 1978, prodded
at virtually every step by new decisions of federal courts, DHEW effected
numerous changes in the Hill-Burton regulations. The general language of the
initial regulations grew progressively into a body of specific rules that set forth
quantifiable standards for hospital compliance with the uncompensated care and
community service obligations. Even as the regulations evolved, however,
Hill-Burton plaintiffs continued to charge that DHEW was not enforcing its
various new regulations and that, despite pressure from the courts, hospital
compliance remained inadequate.
In 1979, again at federal court instigation, DHEW issued the most recent
Hill-Burton regulations.9 In contrast to the piecemeal changes of the 1972-1978
period, these regulations are a comprehensive redraft. The result is a highly
structured, technical compliance document that incorporates the major changes
of the previous generations of court-shaped regulations and, in addition, imposes
new requirements on Hill-Burton facilities. Coupled with these important
changes is DHEW's new and enthusiastic enforcement posture. 0
This new beginning represents a victory for Hill-Burton plaintiffs, who have
litigated for this result for ten years. DHEW has now adopted a plaintiff's
perspective on compliance and has armed itself with a powerful new enforce-

7. 12 Fed. Reg. 6,176, 6,179 (final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§§ 53.62-.63 (Supp. 1947)). For regulatory provisions no longer in effect, this Comment
provides a Federal Register citation with specific characterization of the regulation, its
date, and, for final regulations, its parallel citation in the last Code of Federal Regulations
in which it appeared before being superceded by a new issuance. For regulations that did
not survive to codification in the Code of FederalRegulations, and for uncodified agency
commentary, only a FederalRegister citation is provided. Current regulations are cited to
the 1979 Code of Federal Regulations. This method is employed so that the reader may
better understand the chronology of regulatory change.
8. See Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook I), 319 F. Supp. 603 (E. D. La. 1970)
(defendants' motion to dismiss denied). Cook I was not the first case in which a hospital's
obligation under Hill-Burton was litigated, see, e.g., Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883
(W.D. Mo. 1963), affid, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964) (grantee hospital's refusal to admit
individual did not constitute denial of equal protection), but it was the first in the line of
cases that affected the development of the regulations that is the subject of this Comment.
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (final regulations of May 18, 1979, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.501-607 (1979)).
10. See note 311 and accompanying text infra.
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ment weapon designed to assure that poor persons will receive medical care
under the Act. From a contractual and equitable standpoint, this result might
appear to be long overdue; after all, the provision of uncompensated care and
community service is presumably what hospitals bargained for when they
accepted Hill-Burton funds.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the new regulations are neither
contractually nor equitably sound. The new compliance standards bear no
relationship to the original purpose of the Hill-Burton Act. They alter
dramatically the nature of the original obligations incurred by Hill-Burton
grantees when they accepted federal funds under the program and impose
unexpected and often financially burdensome new requirements upon some
Hill-Burton facilities. Even more important, however, is the fact that the 1979
regulations are fundamentally unsound from a health policy perspective. The
regulations will have little more than a negligible impact on the plight that they
purport to remedy, the access of indigents to adequate medical care; at the same
time they impose inordinate administrative burdens and costs upon Hill-Burton
facilities and their patients.
The 1979 regulations are the unfortunate culmination of Hill-Burton's
aberrant development since 1972. In some respects, the current dilemma has
been unintentionally begotten by a series of related events involving a diverse
chorus of actors, principally a number of hospitals, DHEW, Congress, and the
federal courts. The sequence of development makes an intriguing study of how
government loses control of a well-intentioned program to the point that the
program works at cross-purpose to the original desired end.
This Comment examines the policy issues raised by the development of the
Hill-Burton program from 1946 to date. Part I outlines the legislative history of
the Act and its operation through 1972. Part II traces the complicated course of
Hill-Burton litigation and the resultant changes in its regulations through 1979.
In Part III the serious health care issues raised by the new regulations are
discussed, and Hill-Burton is shown to be an exceedingly expensive and highly
inefficient vehicle for the provision of needed medical care to the poor.
PART

I:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND OPERATION,

1946-1972

Legislative Intent
In 1929, with the onset of the Depression, nearly all privately financed
hospital construction in the United States came to a halt. Not only did building
cease, but between 1928 and 1938 nearly eight hundred hospitals closed." As the
American population grew, the problem of hospital availability and accessibility
was compounded.

11. DIVISION OF HosP. AND MED. FACILITIES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH,

EDUCATION

AND WELFARE,

Two

DECADES OF PARTNERSHIP FOR BETTER PATIENT

CARE 6-9 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 930-F-8, 1966). Although some public works
programs undertook hospital building, these efforts were directed primarily at unemployment problems and did not result in any notable increase in the number of hospitals. Id.
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In response to this problem, the Commission on Hospital Care was organized in 1941. The Commission, which was sponsored by the American
Hospital Association with the assistance of the United States Public Health
Service, 12 completed a nationwide survey that showed the number of hospitals to
be inadequate and their distribution haphazard.'" This information, in addition
to testimony on health needs gathered in hearings by the Senate Subcommittee
on Wartime Health and Education," provided the impetus for Senate consideration of a federal program to improve hospital and health facilities.'5
Two possible approaches to this problem emerged. The sponsors of the
Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Senators Lister Hill of Alabama and
Harold Burton of Ohio, chose what might be termed a conservative activists'
approach, in direct contrast to the Truman administration's broad proposal for a
national health insurance program.'6 Both bills recognized a need for federal
intervention in the health care field and cited the inadequacies of medical
services,'7 but the Hill-Burton program called for a much more narrow and
modest preliminary step toward solution of the problem.' 8 Senator Hill's opening
statement in committee hearings on his bill summarized his intent in
sponsoring the legislation:
The first purpose [of Senate Bill 191] is to assist the States in making a
careful State-wide survey of hospitals and health care facilities. . . in order
to determine where additional facilities are needed and to prepare a

12. The Commission was supported by grants from several private foundations, and
the Public Health Service supplied staff assistance. See Proposed Amendments to the
Public Health Services Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before the Senate Comm. on Education &
Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Hearings].
13. Two DECADES OF PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, at 9.
14. See Investigation of the Education and Physical Fitness of Civilians:Hearings on
S. Res. 74 Before the Subcomm. on Wartime Health & Education of the Senate Committee
on Education & Labor, 78th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1943-44).
15. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 12, at 7 (statement of Sen. Lister Hill). Another
factor in the timing of legislation was the impending return to civilian life of thousands of
Army physicians. It was believed that the improved distribution of adequate hospital
facilities would encourage doctors to locate in underserved areas. See id. at 195.
16. See Proposal for a National Health Program: Hearings on S. 1606 Before the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) [hereinafter cited as
National Health Program Hearings]. The administration offered a five-part proposal,
consisting of programs to: (1) construct facilities; (2) develop public health services and
maternal and child care; (3) expand medical research and professional education; (4)
expand the existing compulsory social security system to encompass mandatory health
insurance; and (5) provide for comprehensive disability insurance. Id. at 1-8 (message
from President Truman).
17. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 12, at 6-9; National Health ProgramHearings,
supra note 16, at 1-8.
18. The Hill-Burton proposal called, in effect, for enactment of the first item of the
five-part Truman proposal. Compare text accompanying note 19 infra with note 16 supra.
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State-wide program for new construction so that all people of the State may
have adequate health and hospital service.
The second purpose . . . would be to assist States, counties, cities and
communities to provide for themselves modern hospitals and health centers
The third purpose .
is to assist and encourage the States to correlate
and integrate their hospital and public-health services and to plan
additional facilities when and where needed ....
No great increase in either [sic] public health, hospital, or medical
services can be expected unless we have a much better distribution of
modern hospital and health-center facilities."'
This statement indicates that the bill was intended to increase and improve
health care facilities in the expectation that more and better hospitals and
health centers would mean more and better health care. In committee hearings,
the building and modernization program was characterized repeatedly as a
"necessary preliminary" to other government programs to assist in actual
service delivery, and it is clear from witness testimony and from many of the
exchanges between Senators and witnesses that further health care enactments
were expected to take up where Hill-Burton was to leave off.2
19. See 1945 Hearings, supra note 12, at 8-9 (statement of Sen. Lister Hill).
20. For example, Dr. Donald C. Smelzer, President of the American Hospital
Association, said:
We believe that the steps provided in this legislation are a necessary preliminary
in the better distribution of hospital and medical care. I am also frank to say that it is
our hope that this step will be followed by, first, a more adequate provision of hospital
and professional care for the medically indigent, those now unable to pay for such
care, and, second, a thoroughly active and aggressive support by the Government of
voluntary prepayment hospital and medical plans.
1945 Hearings,supra note 12, at 10. See id. at 31 (Sen. Pepper's characterization of bill as
a "first step and merely a part of a whole program"); id. at 63-65 (exchange between Sens.
Smith and Ellander and witness, in which bill characterized as "first step in a national
health program," limited to the provision of physical facilities); id. at 80 (exchange
between Sen. Taft and witness, in which bill characterized as one factor in a general
health program). See also id. at 90, 173, 188, 194, 208, 301.
Dr. Thomas Parran, who was then Surgeon General, was an important witness in
the hearings. In response to questioning during his testimony, he noted:
S. 191 is silent on the whole question of medical care for people of low incomes.
Apparently this was a deliberate omission on the theory that the first and most
necessary step is to plan for constructing the most-needed facilities, which facilities
will be required no matter what the plan may be that is adopted for providing for the
payment for hospitals and other medical care.
In other words, it will require a long time to make the surveys and plans, to draw
the actual blueprints on the most-needed facilities, to secure appropriations, and to
arrive at the stage when you have a finished hospital. By that time I assume the
thinking of the sponsors is that there will have been some further action taken by the
State or by the Federal Government.
Id. at 64.
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Questions concerning the actual provision of services through Hill-Burton
facilities were the subject of discussion during the hearings;2 however, reading
of the transcripts overall shows that the committee's focus did not broaden to
include the provision of services as a coequal goal with construction."2 Attention
to the issue of access to federally financed hospitals was expressed primarily
through the committee's concern that the hospitals would not at some later date
be taken over by restrictive interests that would exclude some segments of the
population. 2 Moreover, the committee was concerned that new hospitals should
not be distributed according to the ability of surrounding community residents
to pay for services; instead, hospital locations should be determined by
community need and according to a rational state-wide plan.2'
This attitude was reflected in the text of the Hill-Burton Act as it was
reported out of committee and passed by Congress." The uncompensated care
and community service provisions were inserted in the original draft not as

21. See, e.g., id. at 63-65, 70, 190-91. Such discussion proceeded in a non-conclusory
fashion, with the various Senators and witnesses making vague suggestions as to how the
financing of services might be handled. In contrast, many other less comprehensive and
less financially complicated topics arose, which committee members discussed in much
more detail because of their understood relevance to the bill. See, e.g., id. at 193, 235-38,
301-02 (inclusion of hospital maintenance and operating funds); 70-76, 153, 259
(allocation and amount of federal/state funding shares); 140-46, 156-59, 199, 231
(authority of Surgeon General and Federal Advisory Council); 91-92 (division of
federal/state agency authority).
22. See notes 20 & 21 supra. This interpretation of the Act's legislative history is
shared by another student commentator, who provides a more detailed recitation of the
Committee hearings. See Note, Due Processfor Hill-BurtonAssisted Facilities,32 VAND. L.
REV. 1469, 1475-80 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hill-Burton Facilities].Other commentators have taken a contrary view, concluding that the legislative history of the Act at least
implies congressional intent to provide services. See Rose, supra note 2, at 169-70; Rose,
The Duty of Publicly-FundedHospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254, 261-62 (1970); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A StructuralApproach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 267-68 (1978); Comment, Provisionof
Free Medical Services by Hill-BurtonHospitals, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 351, 354 (1973).
As is explained in Hill-BurtonFacilities,supra, at 1477 n.72, however, "such a conclusion
may be drawn from the quoted fragments of the colloquy, [but] the testimony when read in
context and in toto refutes this result."
23. It may be that the Committee was concerned that certain racial, religious, or
fraternal groups might place restrictions on access to a Hill-Burton facility and thought
that federal dollars should not be used to assist such facilities. This, apparently, was the
thrust of the language of the Act's purpose clause, which said that facilities in each state
should be available "to all their people," see Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 601, 60 Stat. 1041
(1946) (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976)), and of the community service
clause (which was not a part of the bill as introduced), which stated that facilities should
be "made available to all persons residing in the territorial area," id. § 622(f)(1), 60 Stat.
1043 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976)).
24. See 1945 Hearings,supra note 12, at 189-90.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 2519, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 11946] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1558; H.R. REP. No. 2697, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 119461 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1571; Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
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additional substantive components of the Act, but as checks on the inappropriate
use of federal funds, i.e., the provisions were preventive, not affirmative." The
additions directed the Surgeon General to issue regulations prescribing:
(f) That the State plan shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for
the people residing in a State, without discrimination on account of race,
creed, or color, and shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for persons
unable to pay therefor. Such regulation may requirethat before approval of
any application for a hospital or addition to a hospital is recommended by a
State agency, assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant
that (1) such hospital or addition to a hospital will be made available to all
persons residing in the territorialarea of the applicant, without discrimination on account of race, creed, or color . . . and (2) there will be made

available in each such hospital or addition to a hospital a reasonablevolume
of hospital services to persons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be
made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial standpoint.7
There is no apparent indication in the hearing transcripts that Congress'
purpose in the addition of these obligations was other than to ensure that the
hospital building program would proceed in an equitable fashion as a "first step"
toward improved health care for Americans.28
26. Cf. Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Foundation, Civ. No. 725-71
(D.D.C. June 28, 1972), at 5 (community service requirement appears to be negative
prohibition against discrimination that cannot be considered an affirmative mandate). See
text accompanying note 68 infra.
27. Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1042-43 (codified, as amended, at
42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976)) (emphasis added). This section specified an exception to the
equal access provision, however, by allowing separate facilities for "separate population
groups, if the plan [made] equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and
services of like quality for each such group." Id. This portion of the statute was deleted in
response to the court's holding in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), that found the provision unconstitutional. See Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 603(e)(1), 78 Stat. 448 (1964). The Simkins case was a civil
rights action, not a compliance challenge, per se.
28. Further evidence of the Act's purpose is found in reading the entire bill, which
goes into great detail concerning many other provisions, e.g., factors to be considered in
determining the allotment formulae by which federal funds would be distributed among
the states, the manner and method of approval of projects and payments for construction,
the procedure for amendment of a facility's application for funds, the factors prompting
withholding of facility certification. See Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040. By
this detailed drafting, Congress left little doubt as to the precise manner of the Act's
implementation. In contrast, the uncompensated care and community service provisions
are very brief and extremely general. Id. Although use of Congress' failure to provide the
same detail in these provisions as it did in others, as with any interpretation based on
what a legislature has not done, is necessarily inconclusive, an obvious inference to be
drawn from this contrast is that Congress did not intend that the obligations would be a
major financial factor in the program. Other discussion in committee hearings shows that
the Senators understood that the financing of medical services for the indigent was a
complicated financial problem. See note 24 supra. It is therefore difficult to reconcile the
Act's general and superficial treatment of these issues with an intent to provide any
substantial volume of medical services to the poor.
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Program Implementation
The original Hill-Burton Act provided for dual federal-state operation of the
program.' Overall supervision was vested in the Surgeon General, although the
statute limited his regulatory authority by the creation of the Federal Hospital
Council, an appointed body of hospital experts and consumer representatives
that had final and binding power to approve or veto the Surgeon General's
regulations.' Each state was to designate an agency to plan and administer a
state-wide program of hospital construction and modernization.' The plans were
to be submitted to the Surgeon General, who, upon approval, channeled federal
funds through the state agency to individual facilities.2
The first regulations under the Act, promulgated in 1947, restated the
statutory language concerning the community service and uncompensated care
obligations.3 The community service regulations, entitled "Non-discrimination,"
provided that the federally funded facility would be available to all community
residents without regard to race, creed, or color.14 No dollar figure or volume
minimum defined a "reasonable volume" of uncompensated care, and, in
accordance with the Act, the regulation provided for a waiver of this
requirement if a hospital was not financially capable of delivering such care. 5
Free or below cost patient care provided by a facility would satisfy the
requirement; moreover, hospitals that received reimbursement on behalf of such
patients from public or charitable funds could still count such treatment as
uncompensated care. The determination of what constituted a "reasonable
volume" of uncompensated care would take into consideration the conditions in
the hospital's service area, "including the amount of free care that may be
available otherwise than through the applicant."36
These provisions were consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute:
While Congress had expressed concern that Hill-Burton facilities be available to
all people, it had not specified the method of funding care to the indigent and
had not contemplated prohibiting outside contributions to offset the costs of
treating persons unable to pay. The 1947 regulations also carried through the
Act's concept of uncompensated care based on area-wide need.3

29. Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, §§ 622-623, 60 Stat. 1041-42 (1946).
30. Id. § 622, 623(a), 633, 60 Stat. 1042-44, 1048-49.
31. Id. § 612, 623-625, 60 Stat. 1043-46. The state agency was to submit plans for
its construction program, implement the plan, and supervise the participation of grantee
hospitals.
32. Id. § 612, 613, 623-625, 60 Stat. 1041-42, 1043-46.
33. 12 Fed. Reg. 6,176 (final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 53.62-.63 (Supp. 1947)).
34. Id. at 6,179 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.62 (Supp. 1947)). As specified by the
original Act, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1042 (1946), however,
"separate but equal" facilities were permitted on the basis of race. See note 27 supra.
35. 12 Fed. Reg. 6,176, 6,179 (final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 53.63 (Supp. 1947)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Under these terms, federal financing of hospital construction and modernization began. Between 1947 and 1970, nearly four billion dollars flowed to some
seven thousand hospitals and health facilities as the program assisted in the
addition of nearly one-half million hospital beds. 8 During this period, as
Congress renewed appropriations for the program, the Act was amended a
number of times. 9 In 1966 regulatory authority was transferred from the
Surgeon General to the Secretary of DHEW, although the authority of the
Federal Hospital Council remained intact." By a 1970 amendment, the program
was expanded to authorize loans and loan guarantees as well as grants.4'
Throughout these years, the substantive provisions of the statute and the
regulations dealing with the community service and uncompensated care
obligations remained unchanged.2
38. BUREAU OF HEALTH PLANNING AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH RESOURCES
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HILL-BURTON PROGRAM PROGRESS
1, 1947-SEPT. 30, 1976, at 2 (1976). A number of hospitals received more
than one grant during the life of the program, see, e.g., note 229 infra, and some 10,000
grants were made during the 1947-1970 period. Id.
39. Hospital Survey and Construction Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-380, 63
Stat. 898 (authorized Public Health Service to provide grants for research and experiments
relating to development of facilities and resources); Medical Facilities Survey and
Construction Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-482, 68 Stat. 461 (broadened grant program to
include nursing homes, diagnostic centers, chronic disease hospitals); Act of Aug. 1, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-589, 72 Stat. 489 (gave some facilities the option of long term loan instead
of grant); Community Health Services and Facilities Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-395, 81
Stat. 533 (increased nursing home and research appropriations); Hospital and Medical
Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (extended program
through 1969, authorized additional funds including those for new modernization and
replacement program; deleted "separate-but-equal" provision); Comprehensive Health
Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-749, 88 Stat.
1610 (transferred regulatory authority to DHEW, removed demonstration grants for
planning); Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 533
(research and experiment functions of 1949 amendment removed); Act of Oct. 15, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-574, 82 Stat. 1005 (1968) (extended program through 1970); Medical
Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-296, 84
Stat. 337 (extended program through 1973; authorized $500 million for loans and loan
guarantees). The original Act was later amended by the Health Program Extension Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 92 (extended program through 1974; authorized
additional funds). Then, in 1974, appropriations ceased under Title VI when Title XVI was
enacted. See note 1 supra; note 159 and accompanying text infra.
40. See Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Service Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-749, 88 Stat. 1610. See also 31 Fed. Reg. 8,855 (final regulations of
June 25, 1966) (explaining statutory transfer of regulatory authority); 42 U.S.C. § 291c
note (1976) (abolition of the Office of Surgeon General).
41. Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-296, 84 Stat. 337. Although some long term loans had been authorized by the 1958
amendment, Act of Aug. 1, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-589, 72 Stat. 489, the major loan option
program was established by the 1970 amendment.
42. See note 39 supra. By the 1964 amendments, however, the purpose clause of the
original Act was amended to omit the phrase "physical facilities." The new declaration
provided that the purpose of the Act was
to assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for the construction
and the modernization of such public or other nonprofit community hospitals and
REPORT, JULY
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During this period, the provisions were regarded by federal and state
regulatory agencies and Hill-Burton grantees as having no operational effect.
Facilities apparently understood the contractual nature of their acceptance of
Hill-Burton funds, but regarded it as pertinent primarily in the context of the
Act's specification of a twenty-year 'period during which the government
retained a right of recovery of funds in the event of a hospital's sale, transfer, or
conversion into a for-profit concern. 3 It apparently was the understanding of the
agencies and the grantee hospitals that the uncompensated care provision
"required no substantial change or modification in the volume of charity care"
that a grantee hospital had dispensed prior to receiving Hill-Burton money, or
would have dispensed, according to its financial ability, if it had been built
without Hill-Burton funds." The community service obligation was apparently
perceived to mean that a facility would not discriminate in allowing access by
all persons in its service area. 5
Other Developments in the Health Care Field
During this period of Hill-Burton quiescence, the federal government made
further inroads into the health care area. Most notable of these were the 1965

other medical facilities as may be necessary, in conjunction with existing facilities, to
furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people.
Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 600, 78 Stat.
447 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976)). Compare id. with text of original purpose clause,
supra note 3. The meaning of this change is characterized accurately by the author of
Hill-Burton Facilities, supra note 22, at 1471 n.9, who states: "The changes in the
declaration of purpose were intended to provide specifically for modernization and

renovation of hospital and health facilities and not to change the focus of the Act from
providing physical facilities to providing health services themselves." (citing S. REP. No.
1274, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2800).
The amendment's omission of the specific language was to cause unforeseen
problems, however, as courts, quoting selectively from the text of the 1964 purpose clause,
were to find that the Act's purpose was "'to furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or similar
services.'" E.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1117 (10th Cir. 1972); Corum v. Beth
Israel Medical Center (Corum 1), 359 F. Supp. 909, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
43. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 625(e), 60 Stat. 1046 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291i
(1976)). This section provided that the government was entitled to recover one-third of the
value of any facility built with Hill-Burton funds if, during any time within 20 years after
the completion of construction, the facility were sold or transferred to a party not qualified
to file an application under the Act, or ceased to be a nonprofit hospital as defined by the
Act. This language was the basis for the parties' understanding that a contract was formed
by acceptance of Hill-Burton funds. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, No. 79-C-2669 (N.D. Ill., filed June 27. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as AHA District Court Complaint, appended affidavits of present and
former state Hill-Burton agency administrators and hospital administrators. See also
Euresti v. Stenner, 485 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972).
44. See AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43, affidavit of Robert C. Kimball,
former state Hill-Burton administrator, at 3.
45. See id., affidavit of Joseph Pratschner, Director. Division of Health Facilities,
N.D. State Dep't of Health, at 3.
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enactments of government health insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid.
Medicare is a federally funded program that finances health care for the aged.' 6
The Medicaid program, which funds medical assistance to certain categories of
the poor regardless of age, is financed by state and federal matching funds.'4
These programs were, in some respects, the service-funding mechanisms
that had been envisioned by some members of the legislative and executive
branches during the 1940's, when Hill-Burton was being considered. Medicare
and Medicaid, however, were not coordinated with the Hill-Burton program on
important issues concerning the financing of care to indigents. On the one hand,
it might be presumed that the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid would
supplant the uncompensated care obligation of Hill-Burton hospitals, since
many of those who could not afford hospital care would now be eligible for one of
the government insurance programs. Congress' failure to address this issue,
however, permitted the inference that Hill-Burton hospitals were now to fulfill
their uncompensated care obligations by service to people who did not qualify for
Medicare or Medicaid, but who were not able to pay for hospital care. 6 The
failure of the drafters of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to specify this
relationship resulted in their undefined coexistence with Hill-Burton.' 9
Another failure of integration of Medicare and Medicaid and Hill-Burton
occurred because of the reimbursement methods that were set up for the new
insurance programs. To understand this conflict, it is necessary to know a basic
principle of hospital pricing: As in many other businesses, costs are spread. The
rate charged for a surgical procedure covers not only the actual costs of the

46. Title XVIII, Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
in scattered sections of 26, 42 & 45 U.S.C. (1976)). The elderly are the chief beneficiaries of
the program, although persons with certain disabilities and those with end-stage renal
disease are eligible regardless of age. Need is not a factor in entitlement to benefits. "Part
A" Medicare benefits, which provide hospital insurance, are funded primarily through the
Social Security tax. For a synopsis of the Medicare hospital insurance program, see [1979]
1 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
1100-1172; 1200-1281.
47. Title XIX, Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976)). Financial need, in combination with other factors, is the
primary determinant of eligibility. The federal share of program funding is appropriated
annually by Congress from general revenues; the state share is appropriated by state
legislatures, who may include local tax revenues as a state funding source. For a synopsis
of the Medicaid program, see [19791 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 14,010.
48. See notes 46 & 47 supra. Federal law mandates that states provide Medicaid
benefits to persons who receive benefits under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 601-610 (1976) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and either all
persons receiving cash benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1383c (1976) (Supplemental Security Income), or those who can meet additional,
more restrictive eligibility conditions. Eligibility may vary from state to state, as federal
matching funds are also available for medical assistance to cover specified optional groups
who have incomes higher than the above standards. In any case, however, Medicaid does
not cover many people who may be medically needy because of marginal incomes or assets
or other circumstances.
49. Not a problem in 1965, when Hill-Burton was dormant, the nature of the
relationship became important because of later development.
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service, but also a portion of such overhead costs as hospital administration,
principal and interest payments on indebtedness for the physical plant, and
expenses of non-revenue-generating departments such as social work. 0 And, in
almost all hospitals, some portion of total revenues goes to meet the hospital's
losses for charity care or bad debts, so that this care is financed by the charges
paid by privately insured or cash-paying patients."'
In setting the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement policy, the statutes
specified that the government would pay the "reasonable cost" of hospital
services provided to beneficiaries. 52 "Reasonable cost" is not the usual charge
made to privately insured or cash-paying patients, but is a rate determined to be
"reasonable" by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 3 For example, Medicare
might reimburse $75 for a procedure for which a hospital would ordinarily bill
$100. The reasonable cost guidelines also described the hospital expenses that
could be properly apportioned to the programs. Debt service and interest
payments on capital construction loans, for example, are included in Medicare
and Medicaid rates;" charity care and bad debts are specifically excluded M
Although not specified in the enactments, the exclusion of charity care from
"allowable costs" was later interpreted by DHEW to mean that Medicare
and
Medicaid would not share in the cost of providing uncompensated care.5 By this

50. See generally [1979]

1 THE HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 1-8.
51. Id. at 23-26. Privately insured and cash-paying patients are differentiated
because, in some circumstances, they do not pay identical rates. In most states, for
example, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, because of the size of its covered population and its
stable payment record, pays a rate somewhat lower than that charged to a cash-paying
patient. With only a few exceptions, however, even the discounted rates help to offset
charity care losses. Hereinafter, both groups will be referred to as "charge-paying,"
although the charges made to the respective groups may vary somewhat.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1) (1976) (Medicare); id. § 1396a(13)(D) (Medicaid).
Under both programs, a hospital provider is directly reimbursed for care to beneficiaries.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1814(b), 1833(2) (1976). "Reasonable cost" reimbursement to
hospitals is made under the same principles for both programs; the regulations specify that
Medicare's hospital reimbursement policies also apply to Medicaid reimbursement. See 42
C.F.R. § 442.261 (1979). For a detailed explanation of the reasonable cost concept, see
Weiner, "ReasonableCost" Reimbursement for Inpatient HospitalServices UnderMedicare
and Medicaid: The Emergence of Public Control, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 1 (1977).
54. 42 C.F.R. §§ 100.101-.109; 405.402-.404; .501-.502 (1979). Debt service is
payment to the equity holders of a hospital bond or other debt. Medicare and Medicaid also
fund depreciation, id. §§ 405.415-.418, i.e., the government pays for depreciation taken by
hospitals on their physical plants and equipment.
55. Id. § 405.420(a). Cf. note 323 infra (DHEW's continued insistence that Medicare
reimbursement may not contribute to costs of providing Hill-Burton care).
56. DHEW has found that the term "charity care" as employed in the Medicare cost
reimbursement regulations applies to uncompensated care delivered under the Hill-Burton
Act. See note 323 infra. A reading of the cost reimbursement regulations, 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.402, .415 (1979), indicates that this is probably an incorrect application of the rule.
Hill-Burton uncompensated care is not true charity care, i.e., care rendered as a voluntary
philanthropic act for which payment is neither sought nor expected, but is now required by
law to be dispensed by a Hill-Burton hospital. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.501-607 (1979); Part
II infra. Rather, the requirement of delivery of uncompensated care is more analogous to
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policy, the financial burden of funding uncompensated care was borne by private
payors, i.e., charge-paying patients and philanthropy. 7
At the time of Medicare and Medicaid's enactments, the questions of
possible contradictions between these programs and Hill-Burton were abstract.
As will be seen, however, the independent development of the Hill-Burton
program has transformed these financing questions into practical problems that
remain unresolved.
PreliminaryLitigation Under the Act
When, in 1970, representatives of the poor began to seek the provision of
hospital services via the Hill-Burton Act, they turned to the courts.H In Cook v.
Ochsner Foundation Hospital (Cook I),5 plaintiffs charged a number of
Louisiana Hill-Burton hospitals with failing to fulfill their uncompensated care
obligation and asserted that the state health department had failed to enforce
the hospitals' compliance. In a preliminary ruling, the court determined that
because indigent persons were intended beneficiaries of the Hill-Burton Act they
could maintain an action under the statute although the Act contained no
specific authorization for private enforcement.' In reaching this result, the court
stated that it was "not . . .necessary to delve into the legislative history of the
Hill-Burton Act . . .[because] the act, by its own terms, makes it plain that
persons unable to pay are one of the chief sets of beneficiaries of this
legislation. ' ' 1 In fact, by this action, the court implied a remedy in the absence of
interest payments on a capital construction loan: under the Hill-Burton scheme, the
Congress determined that it would gather its return on monies dispensed for hospital
construction or modernization in the form of the availability of services to the needy rather
than by direct repayment. By this analysis, the costs of Hill-Burton uncompensated care
should, like ordinary capital construction interest payments, be an allowable cost under
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.
57. Again, at the time that Medicare and Medicaid were enacted, this problem may
have been largely theoretical. As the insurance programs have grown to represent more
than 35% of all expenditures for hospital care, see Gibson, National Health Expenditures,
1978, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 9-12 (1979), and as the Hill-Burton requirements
have expanded, see Parts II and III infra, this lack of coordination has produced financial
problems for hospitals.
58. Despite the fact that the Act had been in existence since 1946, compliance
litigation did not begin in earnest until the 1970's. But see Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 793 (1964)
(community service provision permitting "separate but equal" facilities held unconstitutional), see note 27 supra; Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), affd, 335
F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964) (Hill-Burton grantee hospital's action in refusing admission to
individual did not constitute denial of equal protection).
59. 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
60. This opinion was limited to the consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss on
the ground that plaintiffs had no right of action under the statute. Id. at 604.
61. Id. at 606 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 291(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat.
447 (1964)).The court analogized the Hill-Burton Act to the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 49-49k (1976), which had established a cooperative federal-state program of public
employment offices, and had been the focus of a 1969 Florida suit, Gomez v. Florida State
Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969). The Gomez plaintiffs, who had obtained
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any clear statutory language and in the face of unexamined legislative history
that was inconsistent with the holding."2
Shortly thereafter, a district court in Florida' and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuite followed the private enforcement ruling of
Cook I. The community service obligation was challenged for the first time in
Perry v. GreaterSoutheast Community HospitalFoundation, in which plaintiffs
charged that DHEW, the District of Columbia, and the defendant hospital, in
addition to failing to enforce or adhere to the uncompensated care obligation,
had ignored the community service obligation. The plaintiffs alleged that the
hospital was in violation of the community service regulation because it did not
provide sufficient services to residents of southeast Washington, D.C.," a poorer
area of the city, and claimed that the supervising agencies should require that

employment through such a public employment office, had charged that their employer
had violated certain regulations under the Act that provided for minimum wages and
housing conditions for migrant workers. The Fifth Circuit had looked to the legislative
history and regulations to determine that such workers were the expected beneficiaries of
the Wagner-Peyser Act, holding that the right of migrant workers to bring a private action
under the statute could therefore be implied. Id. at 575-76.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1976); 12 Fed. Reg. 6,176 (final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947,
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.62-.63 (Supp. 1947)). There were substantial differences in the
focuses of the Wagner-Peyser and the Hill-Burton acts, which were not revealed because of
the court's failure to probe the legislative history of Hill-Burton. The Wagner-Peyser Act
was designed to offer some protections to those workers who moved through the system to
various employers, and the regulations promulgated under the act by the Secretary of
Labor spoke specifically of required working and living conditions, including sanitation
facilities and housing for migrant workers. See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv.,
417 F.2d at 571-73 (discussion of legislative history and regulations).
63. Organized Migrants in Community Action (OMICA) v. James Archer Smith
Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971). In addition, in this case, DHEW was ordered
joined as a party defendant with the hospital and state health agency. Id. at 271-72.
64. Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'g 327 F. Supp. 111
(D. Colo. 1971). The circuit court also reversed the lower court's holding that the Act did
not create any contractual relationship between the federal government and a grantee
hospital. Id. at 1118. Further, it overturned the district court's interpretation of the Act's
"non-interference" clause, 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1976), which prohibited the federal government from injecting itself into the operation or administration of a grantee hospital. 458
F.2d at 1119. Although the district court had stated that this provision prevented the
federal government from maintaining an action to control a hospital's activities, and
reasoned that the plaintiffs could have no greater right to compel the hospital's provision
of care, 327 F. Supp. 111, 114-15 (D. Colo. 1971), the Tenth Circuit found that the
provision "merely bars the attempts of federal officers to interfere with the daily
administration of the hospitals in areas not specifically dealt with in the Act" and did not
limit plaintiffs' enforcement rights, 458 F.2d at 1119. Other courts have since found that
the Hill-Burton Act allowed a private civil action as a means of enforcing the Act's
provisions. E.g., Saine v. Hospital Auth., 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974).
65. Civ. No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972) (defendants' motion for summary
judgment granted). The suit was filed against the corporation that owned the hospital, the
District of Columbia, and DHEW.
66. See id., bench op. at 2-3.
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the hospital admit patients in ratios equal to the characteristics of its service
area population. 7 In an insightful ruling that reached the merits, the court
determined that the negative prohibition against discrimination contained in
the community service regulation could not be construed as an affirmative
mandate to the hospital to provide the type of redistribution of services
suggested by the plaintiffs.6' In fact, the legislative history indicated that
Congress had contemplated an overall plan for the provision of hospital services
and had not directed DHEW to take a "hospital-by-hospital" approach. 6
Although the court was critical of the regulatory agencies' failure to give due
attention to these planning provisions," it ruled against the plaintiffs' claims,
stating that the Act and the regulations set forth no standards under which it
7
could determine if the hospital and the agencies were performing adequately.
The Perry court thus reached a question that had not been considered by the
2
courts' preliminary rulings in previous cases." That is, even if the legislative
history of the Hill-Burton Act were to be construed to confer an implied private
right of action, the question of what relief might be fashioned remained
unanswered by the statute and regulations.
PART II:

METAMORPHOSIS OF THE

AcT, 1972-1979

Initial Regulatory Revision: The Uncompensated Care Obligation
Prompted by the sudden flurry of litigation after more than twenty years of
inactivity, DHEW began to develop standards for hospital compliance with the
uncompensated care obligation. Although challenges to the community service
regulation had been presented in the Perry case, the agency chose to defer those
issues.73 Informal initial regulations concerning the uncompensated care obligation were drafted in September 19717" and formal proposed regulations

67. See id. at 4.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 9.
70. See id. at 3, 7, 11-12.

71. Id. at 5-6. Without standards, the court said, "there is no way that the Court can
function except by considering itself as some kind of administrative agency in a
rule-making and administrative process, which is not the role of the Court." Id. at 6.
72. See notes 60 to 64 and accompanying text supra. Of the earlier cases, only Cook v.
Ochsner Foundation Hospital (Cook 1), 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970), continued to
judgment on the merits. The later Cook rulings are discussed at notes 120 to 132 and 173
to 187 and accompanying text infra.
73. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (preface to binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972)
(noting that only the uncompensated care obligation would be dealt with in forthcoming
regulations).
74. See Rose, supra note 2, at 174 n.37.
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followed. 5 In July 1972 DHEW published binding interim regulations, which
were to be effective until final regulations were issued.7 ' The binding interim
regulations were finalized in June 1973 in largely the same form in which they
had been in effect for the previous year.7
The final regulations gave Hill-Burton facilities two options for compliance
with the uncompensated care obligation. A facility could elect a percentage
minimum option, which in turn offered a choice of two different percentage
calculations. Alternately, it could choose to comply by adopting an "open door"
policy, i.e., pledging that it would turn away no one because of inability to pay."
Under the percentage minimum option, a facility's obligation would be
presumed to be fulfilled if it budgeted for and made available uncompensated
care" at a level that equalled, on an annual basis, either three percent of its
operating costs (less that portion of operating costs attributable to Medicaid and
Medicare patient care) or ten percent of the Hill-Burton assistance received by
it, whichever amount was less.' Annual compliance reports were required of
facilities,8 and if a facility's report indicated that it had not met its chosen
"presumptive compliance" minimum, it would be obliged to submit a plan to
increase its uncompensated care level in future years." Since the Act specified

75. 37 Fed. Reg. 7,632 (proposed regulations of April 18, 1972). Grant program
regulations are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
DHEW, however, has voluntarily bound itself to promulgate all Department regulations
under APA procedures, see 36 Fed. Reg. 2,532 (1971); thus, all agency regulations are
published in the Federal Register in proposed form for public comment before they are
made final. See Rose, supra note 2, at 177 n.57.
76. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972). Apparently,
binding interim regulations were issued in lieu of the usual final regulations because,
inter alia, questions existed concerning the procedural validity of regulations issued by the
Federal Hospital Council when it was not fully constituted. See Perry v. Greater Southeast
Community Hosp. Foundation, Civ. No. 725-71, bench op. at 11 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972).
DHEW stated that it was issuing binding interim regulations until such time as questions
concerning procedural propriety could be removed. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,720 (preface to
binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972).
77. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353 (final regulations of June 22, 1973). The 1972 binding interim
regulations, see note 76 supra, set forth the full text of the regulations. When the final
regulations were issued, the unchanged provisions were not reprinted in the Federal
Register. Thus, with the exception of a few new provisions that are found only in the final
issuance, citation hereinafter will be to the binding interim regulations, 37 Fed. Reg.
14,719 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972).
78. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1978)).
79. This term was defined as services rendered "without charge or at a charge which
is less than the reasonable cost of such services," i.e., free or below cost care. Id. (codified at
42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b)(7)).
80. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d)). These options will be referred to as the 3% of
operating costs and 10% of grants presumptive compliance minimums.
81. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e)(1)).
82. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e)(2)(ii)).
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that a hospital could be exempted from providing a reasonable volume of
uncompensated care "if such requirement is not feasible from a financial
standpoint,"83 the new regulations provided that a facility could, upon demonstration of financial hardship, make application to its state agency for a
prospective waiver or decrease of the presumptive compliance minimum. An
exempted facility would be required to submit a plan to increase its uncompensated care level in the future."
If a facility elected the open door option in lieu of a percentage minimum, it
certified that it would treat all patients regardless of ability to pay for services.'
The amount and dollar value of uncompensated care dispensed under this option
were not subject to any set minimum, and were essentially unregulated by the
government. 7
Upon determining the uncompensated care rate for a particular facility, the
state agency charged with enforcing the Hill-Burton requirements was to
publish a public notice of the hospital's obligation in a local newspaper." The
regulations also directed state agencies to formulate criteria by which hospitals
could determine patient eligibility for Hill-Burton care, listing factors that
should be included in such guidelines.89 In addition, the regulations prescribed
the proper method for calculating the amounts a hospital could properly credit
toward its Hill-Burton obligation: Services rendered to patients for whom a
determination of eligibility had been made prior to treatment could be credited,
but hospitals were also allowed to count services to persons who were deemed
Hill-Burton eligible after treatment but before collection efforts other than
billing were instituted." In determining the dollar amount that could properly
be credited toward the obligation, the regulations adopted the Medicare
"reasonable cost" guideline." Under this standard, a hospital would receive its
Hill-Burton credit based on the rate at which the Medicare program would have

83. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1976).
84. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(c)(1) (1978)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d)).
87. Under the binding interim regulations, a facility electing the open door option
was required to report the amount of uncompensated care rendered, supply a proposed
budget for such care for the coming year, and propose plans to increase that level upon a
finding by the state agency that the previous level was inadequate. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719,
14,721 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972). This requirement was deleted,
however, in the final regulations issued in June 1973. See 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353, 16,354
(final regulations of June 22, 1973, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e) (1978)).
88. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,722 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h)(4) (1978)).
89. Id. at 14,721-22 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g)). DHEW stated that the criteria
should require consideration of income, insurance coverage, family size, and other
financial obligations or resources in relation to the cost of the hospital services provided.
90. Id. at 14,721 (codified, as amended, at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f)(1)).
91. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b)(6), (7)).
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reimbursed for the service rendered, not the usually higher charge that the
hospital would have billed to a privately insured or cash-paying patient.92
In addition to the substantive requirements for facility compliance, the
regulations set forth important new provisions for other aspects of the program.
First, state Hill-Burton agencies were required to monitor hospital performance
and to institute enforcement mechanisms, including sanctions against noncomplying facilities. 3 Second, at the behest of the Federal Hospital Council, an
important limitation was placed on the scope of the uncompensated care
obligation. The regulations stated that the obligation, and the attendant new
regulations, would pertain to a facility for twenty years after the completion of
grant-financed construction, i.e., for only that period of time during which the
government retained a right of recovery." At the expiration of that time, a
facility would be released from its uncompensated care obligation. 5

92. See note 53 and accompanying text supra. In the preface to the binding interim
regulations, the Secretary of DHEW attempted to clarify the terms of the previous
proposed regulations dealing with the reasonable cost crediting requirements. In fact, the
attempted clarification created more confusion regarding the amount that could properly
be credited toward a hospital's Hill-Burton obligation. The explanation read:
The definition of 'uncompensated services' has been changed [from that contained
in the proposed regulations, see 37 Fed. Reg. 7,632, 7,633 (proposed regulations of
April 18, 1972)] to make clear that the level of uncompensated services is measured by
the difference between the reasonable cost of the services provided to persons unable
to pay therefor and the amount charged such persons for such services.
37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,720 (preface to binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972). By
this, the Secretary obviously intended to disallow a hospital's claim for a free service credit
when it in fact had provided only below cost service (i.e., the patient had paid some portion
of the bill), but the actual effect of the "clarification" was quite the opposite. This led some
facilities, and some judges, to believe that it was permissible, when supplying services to
Medicare or Medicaid patients, to properly charge against the Hill-Burton obligation the
difference between the usually higher charge for the service and the lesser "reasonable
cost" reimbursement that was made to the hospital by the government. See, e.g., Newsom
v. Vanderbilt Univ., 433 F. Supp. 401, 418 (M.D. Tenn. 1978); note 234 and accompanying
text infra; Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook III), Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March
12, 1975); text accompanying note 185 infra.
93. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,722 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978)).
94. Id. at 14,720 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(a)). In the case of a Hill-Burton loan or
loan guarantee, the obligation would exist for only the period during which the loan
remained unpaid. Id. It appears that this limitation was imposed because of the Council's
perception that the entire contractual agreement between the government and a funded
hospital expired 20 years after the completion of Hill-Burton financed construction. See
note 43 supra; accord, AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43, affidavit of Pat N.

Groner, former member of the Federal Hospital Council, at 1. This provision of the 1972
regulations applied retroactively, so that hospitals that had received Hill-Burton grants
from 1947 through 1952 were exempted from the new uncompensated care compliance
standards.
95. The preface to the final uncompensated care regulations of 1973 reveals that
DHEW attempted, without success, to persuade the Federal Hospital Council to delete this
time limitation. See 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353 (preface to final regulations of June 22, 1973).
DHEW was similarly rebuffed in its attempt to convince the Council that state
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The regulations that became effective in 1972 and 1973 satisfied neither
indigent plaintiff groups, who had expected more from DHEW,96 nor hospitals,
who had hoped for less regulation. 7 Regardless of the perspective from which
they were viewed, however, it is clear that the regulations changed significantly
many of the assumptions under which Hill-Burton hospitals had operated. After
twenty-five years, the first quantification of the "reasonable volume" of
uncompensated care term and the institution of the specific provisions for cost
calculation, patient eligibility determination, reporting and enforcement had
dramatically altered the nature of the contract under which Hill-Burton
hospitals had received federal money. The vague obligation to treat the needy
had been transformed into specific requirements. Underlying these changes,
however, were more subtle and powerful shifts in the government's conceptualization of the Hill-Burton Act.
First, DHEW had ignored the interpretation of the statute in the Perry case,
wherein the court had noted that it did not appear that Congress had intended a
hospital-by-hospital approach to regulation, 8 and had focused only on individual
facilities. That is, the Act's attention to area-wide needs through individual
hospitals was redefined by the regulations, which were concerned only with the
amount of uncompensated care dispensed by an individual facility.' The
regulations compounded this error and further eroded the concept of area-wide
needs by setting a uniform compliance standard. The percentage options were

Hill-Burton agencies should be permitted to demand volumes of uncompensated care
higher than the 3% of operating costs or 10% of grants presumptive compliance minimums
of hospitals that could afford to meet higher levels of need in their communities. The
proposed uncompensated care regulations, see 37 Fed. Reg. 7,632, 7,633 (proposed
regulations of April 18, 1972), had permitted this action, but the provision was deleted in
the binding interim regulations, see 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,722 (binding interim
regulations of July 22, 1972, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h)(1) (1978)).
96. Cf. Rose, supra note 2, at 174-78 (chronology of decline in required levels of
uncompensated care through the draft, proposed and binding interim regulations
preceding final issuance).
97. Although hospitals were subject to less of an uncompensated care burden under
the final regulations than they would have borne under previous proposals, the final
issuance did set standards for compliance that had not been present before.
98. Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Foundation, Civ. No. 725-71, bench
op. at 9 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972).
99. It would seem that the recent decisions of the federal courts, which DHEW had
acknowledged had prompted its promulgation of regulations, see 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719,
14,720 (preface to binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972), may have been influential
in this regard, if only because all four suits involved individual hospitals. This may have
biased DHEW's selection of the regulatory paradigm of individual hospitals, which was
already appealing because of the practicalities of administering the regulations. Hospitals
were, after all, the ultimate grantees and contractees under the Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c,
f, & j (1976); they had been determined by several federal courts to be proper parties in
enforcement actions, cf. notes 59 to 72 and accompanying text supra (cause of action
existed against grantee hospitals); and they were established bureaucracies that could be
easily monitored for compliance. In theory, however, this hospital-by-hospital regulatory
scheme obscured and undercut the Act's focus on area-wide accessibility of care.
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based solely on a facility's operating costs or the size of its Hill-Burton grant, 1°°
not on the needs of the community surrounding the hospital, much less larger
area-wide concerns.
The open door option, which could be selected by a facility as an alternative
to a percentage compliance option, could, in theory, have comported with the
Act's focus on a need for area-wide care. DHEW's attempt to be responsive,
however, left much to be desired. It left the choice of a percentage compliance
minimum or open door option in the hands of a grantee hospital, without
attempting to coordinate facilities' choices with one another or with area-wide
needs.
A second major reinterpretation of the Act occurred in the definition of the
term "uncompensated services" and the omission of previous references to the
permissible practice of reimbursement by outside sources for services to charity
patients. 10 ' Under the new regulations only expenses for which a hospital was
not reimbursed could be properly credited toward its Hill-Burton obligation.
Furthermore, the regulations did not address the financing issue that had been
raised by the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid enactments; no provision was made
whereby the rates paid by the government through these programs would help
to pay for the volume of uncompensated care that hospitals were now required to
provide.0 2 By forbidding both charity reimbursement and government subsidy as
a means of financing the required uncompensated services, the regulations
placed the entire financial responsibility for uncompensated care on grantee
hospitals as a sort of quid pro quo for federal assistance that was never
contemplated by the statute." In turn, hospitals were faced with the prospect of
either finding some way to absorb these costs, or passing them along to
charge-paying patients in the form of higher rates for subsidization of an
increased uncompensated care obligation.
Thus, the regulations, taken as a whole, began the evolution of the
Hill-Burton Act from a "first step" national hospital construction program into
the first step toward the establishment of an unfunded national program for the
provision of medical services to the indigent. As indicated by the legislative
history of the Act, particularly by the relatively small amount of inconclusive
discussion in committee concerning a funding mechanism for services to

100. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1978)). The only exception to this standard allowed a hospital to
seek permission to establish a lower percentage level if compliance was not financially
feasible. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(c)(1)).
101. Compare id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b)(7)) with 12 Fed. Reg. 6,176, 6,179
(final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.63 (Supp. 1947)). See also text
accompanying note 35 supra.
102. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,720-22 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972,
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b) (1978)). See also text accompanying note 56 supra.
103. As noted, in hearings on the original Act, eventual state or federal funding for
indigents' medical care was anticipated. See, e.g., 1945 Hearings,supra note 12, at 188-9 1,
211, 286. See also note 20 supra.
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indigents, 8° and the language of the statute itself, which made only general
reference to the issue,"'5 this was not the intent of the Act.
Moreover, DHEW's failure to consider the interrelationships of Hill-Burton
and Medicare and Medicaid continued the previous lack of coordination between
the programs. In the 1972 regulations, the only recognition of the existence of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs was the fact that the calculation of the
three percent of operating costs percentage compliance minimum exempted
those operating costs attributable to Medicare and Medicaid patient care.' 6 By
implication, however, the 1972 regulations did clarify the other issue raised by
the insurance programs' enactments: It was now clear that the uncompensated
care obligation had not been supplanted by the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, i.e., treatment of patients under these programs did not fulfill a
hospital's uncompensated care obligation.
Despite the changes demanded by the 1972 and 1973 regulations, it appears
that they precipitated minimal modification of actual program operation. It
appears that most state agencies, responsible for supervision and enforcement of
the regulations, did not regard the new terms as mandating any major
redirection of their previous activities. 07 Most hospitals elected the open door
compliance option, apparently with the understanding that this option permitted them to continue whatever charity care policies had previously been in
effect." 8 This understanding was, in at least some instances, fostered by the
state agencies."' In any case, under the open door option regulation such
hospitals were freed from reporting the amount of unccmpensated care
delivered,"' so the agencies had no means to gauge performance. As a rule, with
regard to this and other elements of the uncompensated care regulations, the
pre-1972 attitude prevailed and the new requirements were largely ignored.

104. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
106. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972,
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b)(4), (d) (1978)).
107. See Rose, supra note 2, at 181-94.
108. Id. at 190 (citing 1974 report showing that approximately 60% of facilities had
chosen the open door option); AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43 (appended
affidavits attesting that grantees understood that the 1972 uncompensated care regulations required no substantial change in the volume of charity care that hospitals had been
providing prior to the regulation).
109. See AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43 (appended affidavits of present
and former state Hill-Burton agency administrators attesting that their state agencies had
understood that the uncompensated care regulations required no substantial change or
modification in the amount of charity care that hospitals were required to dispense).
110. See 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353, 16,354 (final regulations of June 22, 1973, codified at 42
C.F.R. § 53.111(e) (1978)). This waiver from reporting was an additional advantage of the
open door option as it accorded hospitals the most administrative flexibility. See text
accompanying notes 86 & 87 supra.

1979]

THE HILL-BURTON ACT

Regulatory Development through Litigation: Judicial Influence on the
Uncompensated Care and Community Service Obligations
The 1972 uncompensated care binding interim regulations were attacked by
indigent plaintiffs soon after their promulgation. In Corum v. Beth Israel
Medical Center (Corum I)," plaintiffs contended that the regulations were
invalid in their entirety because the veto authority granted by the Act to the
Federal Hospital Council was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. Alternately, they claimed that several provisions were invalid because of
their inconsistency with the Act's purpose." 2 In addition, they contended that
Hill-Burton funding for one portion of a facility - in Beth Israel's case, a new
rehabilitation clinic - necessarily mandated the provision of free or below cost
services throughout the entire hospital."' The defendants asserted that the Act
required the provision of services only in the federally funded portion of the
facility." ' Deferring the invalidity issues,"' the court ruled on Beth Israel's
motion to dismiss the distribution of services count, holding that the Act
required a recipient facility "to provide such services in such portion or portions
of its facility as will constitute a reasonable volume in light of the needs of the
community and the amount of the grant.""' 6 From the premise that the Act's
purpose was "'to furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or similar services,'" the
court declared that grantee hospitals could not designate only one portion of
their facility and provide only one type of service." 7 On the other hand, the
section of the Act that made reference to the availability of a reasonable volume
of charity care "'in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or
modernized"' with federal funds indicated that enforcement agencies "need not
require services to be provided in the entire facility.""'
Corum I was the first instructionary interpretation of the Hill-Burton Act.
The ruling implied that the Act permitted but did not require DHEW to demand

111. 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (class action against hospital and DHEW;
defendants' motion to dismiss denied).
112. Id. at 911-12.
113. Id. at 917.
114. Id.
115. The invalidity claims had been made by the plaintiffs while the binding interim
regulations, 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972), were in
effect. Subsequent to the filing, final regulations were promulgated. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353
(final regulations of June 22, 1973). In the first portion of the opinion the court reviewed
plaintiffs' motions to supplement the complaint to reflect these developments. It granted
leave to file a new complaint attacking the delegation of authority to the Federal Hospital
Council and challenging the substantive validity of the final regulations. 359 F. Supp. at
913-14.
116. 359 F. Supp. at 917. Otherwise, the court said, it would be "impossible to require
any services of a facility whose nursing residence, for example, Iwasl constructed with
federal funds." Id.
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976)). The court found that the Act did not delegate
this discretion to a recipient facility.
118. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1976)).
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Hill-Burton care throughout the facility. Most important, however, was the
court's misconstruction of the statute, which led it to assume that the Act's
purpose was to furnish services. This finding marked a further step in
Hill-Burton's transformation from a construction and modernization program to
a service provision program.
By this time, DHEW was involved in other regulatory changes, which had
been precipitated by developments in Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital
(Cook I)." In Cook II," a new charge under the community service obligation121
attacked the hospitals' admission practices 22 and sought to compel DHEW
enforcement of the. community service requirements of the Act and the
regulations by prohibition of the policy.'" DHEW's response to this challenge
was in sharp contrast to its response to the uncompensated care suits, where it
acquiesced readily to general calls for regulation. 2 ' The agency defended on
statutory interpretation grounds and did not contest any of the factual
allegations relating to the hospitals' admissions policies. First, DHEW claimed
that since promulgation of any community service regulation was discretionary
under the Act, enforcement of the existing community service regulation was
similarly discretionary.
In effect, DHEW argued, the greater power of

119. 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970). See notes 59 to 62 and accompanying text supra.
120. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972).
121. The general terms of the original community service regulation, 12 Fed. Reg.
6,176, 6,179 (final regulations of Sept. 16, 1947, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.62 (Supp. 1947)),
remained in effect, although the regulation had been amended to reflect the deletion of the
"separate-but-equal" facilities provision from the statute. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.112 (1971);
note 27 supra.
122. Plaintiffs attacked, as invalid under the requirement of the Act and regulations
that Hill-Burton facilities be "made available to all persons residing in the territorial
area," the hospitals' admitted discrimination in admissions against Medicaid patients and
their requirements that patients be admitted by a private physician with hospital staff
privileges. 61 F.R.D. at 358-59 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976)).
In Cook I, the plaintiffs had charged the hospital and the state agency with failure
to adhere to or enforce the uncompensated care obligations. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation
Hosp. (Cook I), 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) (defendants' motion to dismiss denied).
The amended complaint added DHEW as a defendant.
By an interim consent order in August 1973, the uncompensated care claims
against the defendant hospitals and the state Hill-Burton agency were settled. 61 F.R.D.
at 356-57. The published opinion includes the text of the consent order. By its terms, the
defendant hospitals agreed to provide specific dollar amounts of charity care on an annual
basis, and to develop programs to increase their participation in the Medicaid program,
and the state health agency agreed to supervise hospital compliance.
123. 61 F.R.D. at 359. Implicit in these charges was the plaintiffs' objective of forcing
DHEW to draft new community service regulations to supercede the terms of the 1947
regulations.
124. See notes 78 to 95 and accompanying text supra. See also note 156 infra.
125. The Act stated that DHEW "shall by general regulations prescribe ... that the
State plan shall provide for adequate hospitals and other facilities ....
Such regulations
may also require that before approval of an application . . . [assurance shall be received
that the facility] .
will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial area
....

"

42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976).
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discretion to issue a regulation included the lesser power of discretion to enforce
an existing regulation. The court disagreed, finding that since DHEW had
promulgated a community service regulation, it "oweld] the plaintiffs the
obligation" to enforce it.26
DHEW then contended that the community service regulation was limited
to prohibiting "'discriminatory admission practices resulting in an absolute
exclusion of certain segments of the public,' ",.27 i.e., racial discrimination as
prohibited by the Act.'" The court, however, turned that choice of words back on
the agency and found that DHEW's failure to issue regulations prohibiting
discrimination against Medicaid patients resulted in their absolute exclusion
from services, a "clear violation" of the language and intent of the Hill-Burton
Act." It ordered DHEW to require "that Hill-Burton recipients participate in
the Medicaid Program and refrain from excluding persons on the basis that they
are recipients of Medicaid."'30
The court had thus concluded that the language of the 1946 Act
contemplated another federal health program that was not enacted until 1965.1'1
The singular focus of this ruling was the community service requirement; the
court did not recognize the financial relationship between Medicaid and
Hill-Burton's uncompensated care requirement. The court's ruling meant that
hospitals were required to participate in a government insurance program the
payments under which did not help to offset the costs of providing care to other
patients under the Hill-Burton uncompensated care requirement.'32 Although
the court accomplished the favorable result of improved access to hospital care
by Medicaid patients, its decision was based on faulty analysis of the
Hill-Burton Act and was made in isolation from broader questions concerning
the relationship of the Hill-Burton program to other health care initiatives.
Cook IFs activism in ordering a regulatory change was another step in the
courts' role in shaping the Hill-Burton regulations, far exceeding the interpretations of the early private enforcement rulings, and going beyond Corum Fs
interpretation of the Act and the uncompensated care regulations.

126. 61 F.R.D. at 360.
127. Id. (quoting DHEW brief).
128. See Title VI, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1041 (1946).
129. 61 F.R.D. at 360-61.
130. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766 (preface to final regulations of Aug. 30, 1974), quoting the
decree in Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook III), Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. May
29, 1973), which was issued separately from the- published opinion.
131. See note 47 supra. Although one commentator has argued that some of the
legislative history of the 1964 Hill-Burton amendments (which had not altered the
wording of the 1946 community service obligation) indicated "congressional awareness
that. . . the requirement. . . might be interpreted, in later years, to refer to issues other
than racial discrimination," Rosenblatt, supra note 22, at 280 (citing 1964 Hill-Burton
amendments, Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 603(e), 78 Stat. 447 (1964)), even this reasoning
provides little justification for the court's finding that the actual text of the Act prohibited
discrimination against Medicaid beneficiaries.
132. See notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text supra.
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Nine months after Cook II, DHEW issued proposed regulations dealing with
the community service obligation." The proposal provided that Hill-Burton
hospitals would be required to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and, like the uncompensated care regulations, required a state plan
for review, evaluation, and enforcement.' The final regulations, binding as of
the August 1974 publication date, repeated the proposed regulations and
acknowledged the role of Cook 11 in prompting their issuance.' 5 The plenary
authority of the Federal Hospital Council was again exercised, however, by the
addition of a twenty-year time limit on facilities' community service obligation.'" This provision, like the identical limitation on the uncompensated care
7
obligation, was apparently added over the objection of the Secretary.
Thus, almost three years after the lack of enforcement of the community
service obligation had first been raised in Perry v. Southeast Community
HospitalFoundation,' DHEW had promulgated binding regulations concerning
the requirement. These regulations, and the court order mandating them,
further entrenched the perception of Hill-Burton as a service-provision statute,
and reiterated the notion that hospitals could properly be subject to redefinition
and expansion of the terms of their original Hill-Burton obligations. Furthermore, issuance of the new court-ordered community service standards set a
precedent for judicial regulation under the Act and took the step of linking
receipt of Hill-Burton funds with Medicare and Medicaid. The linkage was
imperfect, however, because DHEW, like the Cook II court, ignored the financial
impact of this policy change.
Even before the new community service regulations became effective,
however, reargument in the case of Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center'39 had
produced another opinion on the uncompensated care issue. In Corum II,'"° the
court faced the plaintiffs' claims that the uncompensated care regulations were

133. 39 Fed. Reg. 1,446 (proposed regulations of January 9, 1974).
134. Id. at 1,447.
135. Id. at 31,766 (preface to final regulations of Aug. 30, 1974).
136. See id. at 31,767 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(a) (1976)). For facilities that had
received a Hill-Burton loan or loan guarantee the community service obligation existed for
the period during which the loan remained outstanding.
137. See id. (preface to final regulations of Aug. 30, 1974). According to one
commentator, "The sole reason given by the Federal Hospital Council for inserting this
limitation was consistency with the . .. [uncompensated care] . . . regulation." Rose,
supra note 2, at 180 n.3. See also note 43 supra. Like the uncompensated care time
limitation, the exemption did not account for a hospital's past service to Medicaid patients
or the need in the community. The effect was substantially the same as the previous time
limitation in that hospitals built with grants between 1947 and 1954, and hospitals that
had repaid their loans were not bound by the regulations to accept Medicaid patients.
138. Civ. No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972). See notes 65 to 71 and accompanying text
supra.
139. 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See notes 111 to 118 and accompanying text
supra.
140. Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Corum 1I), 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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totally invalid because the Act's requirement of Council approval of regulations
constituted a delegation of legislative power to a private body not subject to the
control of Congress or the Secretary.' The motivation for this challenge was
undoubtedly plaintiffs' perception that the Council was biased in favor of
hospital interests"' and their cognizance of the dissension between DHEW and
the Council on several important provisions of the regulations."' The court,
although recognizing the Council's veto power, did not agree that the delegation
was constitutionally defective. The Council did "not itself make regulations,"
but held only approval authority.'
Thus defeated in their attempt for total invalidation, the plaintiffs argued
that several provisions of the uncompensated care regulations were inconsistent
with Congress' purpose in enacting the Hill-Burton Act. First, they claimed, the
Act did not permit a uniform compliance requirement based on hospitals'
operating costs or the amount of the Hill-Burton grant. Rather, the intent in the
Act was to predicate the "reasonable volume" determination for a given hospital
on the uncompensated care needs of the surrounding community." ' Alternately,
the plaintiffs asserted, even if a percentage compliance concept were valid, the
three percent of operating costs or ten percent of grants figures that had been
established by the regulations were arbitrary and set an artificial limit on the
amount of care that a hospital was required to provide." 6 The plaintiffs also
challenged the validity of the time limitation on the uncompensated care

141. Id. at 552.
142. Cf. Rose, supra note 2, at 168, 176 (regulators may become "captives" of regulated
interests). The statute required that 6 of the 12 members of the Council be "persons who
are outstanding in fields pertaining to medical facility and health activities" and the
remaining 6 members be consumer representatives. 42 U.S.C. §291k(a) (1976). In another
regulatory challenge, it was asserted that some of the regulations should be invalidated
because of the conflicts of interest of some Council members who were administrators of
grantee hospitals that stood to benefit from the Council's actions. Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hosp. (Cook III), Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975). See text
accompanying note 174 infra.
143. It was clear that the Council had forced the Secretary to delete from the final
uncompensated care regulations the original provision that would have allowed a level of
charity care higher than the 3% of operating costs or 10% of grants figure to be demanded
of hospitals that had both greater community needs and the financial resources to meet
them. See note 95 supra. Also, it appeared that the time limitation on both the
uncompensated care and community service obligations had been added by the Council
over DHEW objection. See notes 95 & 137 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, as
the Corum II court noted, it appeared that the provision allowing hospitals to delay patient
eligibility determinations until after treatment and billing had been added over DHEW
objection. 373 F. Supp. at 552 (referring to 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,721 (binding interim

regulations of July 22, 1972, codified at 42 C.F.R. §53.111( (1978))).
144. 373 F. Supp. at 553. The court relied on a number of Supreme Court decisions that
had approved Congressional action that "'merely placed a restriction upon its own
regulation.'" Id. (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939)).

145. 373 F. Supp. at 553-55.
146. Id. at 556.
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obligation and the provision that allowed a hospital to delay patient eligibility
determinations until after billing.'4 '
At this point the complicated course of Hill-Burton history since 1970 began
to limit the options available to the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the courts.
The court began by noting that a "long line of cases" commanded judicial
deference to agency interpretation of a statute, which was not to be invalidated
except in extraordinary circumstances. 4 ' Further, although the court recognized
that community need was one factor in determining the level of uncompensated
care, it reasoned that a regulatory scheme based totally on community need,
without regard for operating costs, the size of the grant, or a hcspital's financial
condition, would have the potential to discourage hospitals' acceptance of
Hill-Burton funds for expansion and improvement. The court declined to hold
that the presumptive compliance guideline would be reasonable in its application to all Hill-Burton facilities, but did find it reasonable in its application to
Beth Israel.' 49
Again reiterating the narrowness of its holding, the court found that the
time limitation as applied to Beth Israel bore a reasonable relationship to the
ends of the statute. The plaintiffs had argued that absence of a statutory time
limitation on the uncompensated care obligation showed the regulations to be
invalid, but the court said that the Act's silence could also be interpreted as
consistent with Congressional desire to leave the task of defining the obligation
to DHEW and the Federal Hospital Council. Also, the combination of the
presumptive compliance guidelines and the twenty-year limitation produced a
result that was "reasonable given the size of the grant.""
The court sustained plaintiffs' third regulatory challenge, however, striking
down the regulation that allowed a hospital to delay determination of a patient's
Hill-Burton eligibility until after billing. It noted that the delay might deter
poor persons from seeking medical care because of uncertainty about their
ability to pay, or might result in a patient's exclusion from eligibility if the
hospital's obligation was satisfied by the time of billing. The court concluded
that permitting hospitals to count bad debts toward their Hill-Burton obligations was contrary to statutory intent, which it characterized as the provision of
services to those who were "'unable,' not merely unwilling to pay."51

147. Id. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,720-21 (binding interim regulations of July 22,
1972, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(a) and (f) (1978)). The theory for the latter challenge
was that delayed determinations violated the Act's purpose by permitting a hospital to
count bad debts and uncollectible accounts toward its Hill-Burton obligation. See 373 F.
Supp. at 557; text accompanying note 151 infra.
148. 373 F. Supp. at 554.
149. Id. at 556. Beth Israel's grant was relatively new, and a substantial portion of the
20-year time period remained outstanding. It appears that the court did not want to
speculate on the validity of the 3% of operating costs or 10% of grants presumptive
compliance minimums as applied to older Hill-Burton facilities where only short times
remained in the obligation period.
150. Id. at 556-57.
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
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In September 1974, almost nine months after Corum II, DHEW sent a
memorandum to state agencies informing them that the "billing provision" had
been found invalid, and setting forth a revised provision to be enforced until
formal rule-making ensued.'
In March 1975, proposed regulations announced
new standards for patient eligibility determination prior to treatment.' 53 In
conjunction with the prior determination standard, DHEW proposed a requirement that facilities post notices on their premises to inform patients of the
availability of uncompensated care."
The Corum II decision was thus another step in the process by which certain
aspects of the Hill-Burton Act were being defined with increasing precision, but
its importance extended beyond the fact that it had prompted another regulatory
change. The decision began the process by which the courts, exercising their
legitimate authority over DHEW's regulatory interpretations of the Act, shaped
the development of a set of regulations that are neither reflective of the Act's
original purpose nor sound from a health care policy perspective. In theory, the
principles of judicial review of administrative action operate to give deference to
agency subject matter expertise, and to check clear instances of agency
overreaching.'55 As illustrated by Corum II, however, application of these
principles was particularly unsuited to Hill-Burton, where DHEW had issued
regulations in a haphazard fashion, isolated from other health policy issues, so
that the regulations were less the progeny of agency expertise than of chance.
The courts' role in interpreting the meaning of the Act only contributed to this
problem, as DHEW continued to react to decisions made by judges whose sole
focus was the Act because they could not take cognizance of broader policy
implications. Corum II, like other decisions that would follow it, placed DHEW
in the position of reacting to the interpretation of the Act instead of initiating a
policy-oriented approach to interpretation by which, ideally, the agency could
have coordinated the generation of regulations with the other health care
developments and programs under its aegis."
152. Notification Memorandum from Director, DHEW Division of Facilities Utilization, Health Resources Administration (Sept. 5, 1974).
153. See 40 Fed. Reg. 10,686 (proposed regulations of March 7, 1975).
154. Id. Apparently, DHEW believed that posted notice would make potentially
eligible patients seek Hill-Burton information and that this, in turn, would make prior
determination an easier task.
155. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-1 (1976).
156. No legal reasons exist for DHEW's repeated deferral to district court interpretations of the Act and its failure to pursue appellate relief in these and later cases. Rather,
the explanation probably lies with the political and organizational nature of the agency.
DHEW is one of the more political federal agencies, dealing as it does with many human
service programs that are subject to rapid change with political shifts. This political
malleability may have made DHEW less willing than other agencies to stand by its
positions and to pursue further judicial review. Also, DHEW may have been reluctant to
appeal in the Hill-Burton cases because of its own "dirty hands," i.e., its failure to
promulgate any meaningful regulations until pushed to do so by the courts may account
for its defensive stance in subsequent suits. Moreover, because the expenses of compliance
were borne by grantee hospitals, the government had little economic incentive to appeal
the rulings on the new Hill-Burton regulations; DHEW's costs were limited to those
incurred in redrafting and enforcing the regulations.

344

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

CongressionalInput
While DHEW was reacting to the Corum 11 ruling, another significant
development took place with Congress' enactment of Title XVI of the Public
Health Service Act,157 known as the new Hill-Burton Act. The new Act was
important to facilities funded under Title VI, the original Hill-Burton Act,"
because many of the provisions of the new title were made applicable to these
older facilities. Although the 1946 Act was not repealed, no appropriations have
been made under it since 1974.' Title VI retains vitality in that provisions not
superceded by Title XVI continue to apply to facilities funded under it.
In authorizing grants and loans to health facilities, Title XVI preserved the
uncompensated care and community service obligations. The new Act specified,
however, that these obligations would apply "at all times" after the receipt of
Title XVI funds.'16 The new statute placed total regulatory authority for both
Title XVI and the original Title VI with the Secretary of DHEW, and by
omission abolished the role of the Federal Hospital Council in Title VI
regulation. 8 ' DHEW's authority to determine the manner in which Title
VI-assisted facilities were to comply with their uncompensated care and
community services requirements was limited, however, by the new Act's
specification that Title VI facilities were to be regulated to comply with the
contractual assurances they had given "at the time [Hill-Burton] assistance was
received."'62 Title XVI expanded the role of DHEW, making it the primary
enforcer of Title VI compliance and limiting the enforcement role of state
agencies. 1 Although Congress specifically added that a private right of action

157. Title XVI of the National Health Planning and Resources Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-641, 80 Stat. 2258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300o-300t (1976)).
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976).
159. See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (preface to proposed regulations of Oct. 25, 1978) (DHEW
explanation of cessation of Title VI funding).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 300o-3(b)(1)(J) (1976).
161. Id. § 300o-1.
162. Id. § 300o-1(6). By this phrase, it would appear that Congress intended that the
20-year time limitation on the uncompensated care and community service regulations
would continue for Title VI facilities. The time limitation, although not a term of many of
the original contracts, had been added by DHEW regulations, see notes 94 & 95, 136 & 137
and accompanying text supra, and, in the case of the time limitation on the uncompensated care obligation, had been upheld by a federal court. See Corum v. Beth Israel
Medical Center (Corum II), 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); text accompanying note 150
supra.
163. DHEW was given complete authority for Title XVI enforcement. The new Act
required DHEW periodically to investigate Title VI- and XVI-assisted facilities to
ascertain their compliance with their obligations, and permitted the agency to invoke
sanctions, including a request to the Attorney General to bring an action for specific
performance against a noncomplying facility. 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2 (1976).
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would exist for enforcement of hospitals' assurances, it limited that right by
mandating a preliminary administrative complaint process through DHEW.'"
The adoption of Title XVI has been viewed by some commentators as
Congressional affirmation of the growth and direction of the Hill-Burton
regulations between 1972 and 1975, a sort of ex post facto expression of the
legislative purpose of the original Act.'" Unquestionably, Congress did not use
the enactment of Title XVI as an opportunity to disavow or disapprove the
evolution of the Hill-Burton uncompensated care and community service
requirements. In fact, quite the opposite happened: Not only did the legislature
validate the perception of Hill-Burton as a service-provision statute, but it added
many of the new provisions in Title XVI because of dissatisfaction with
enforcement agencies' behavior."'
The explanation for this action, however, is unclear. It may be that
Congress simply fell prey to the change in perception of Hill-Burton's function;
that is, that the metamorphosis of the requirements by the courts and DHEW
caused Congress to join the ranks of the other government branches that had
viewed Hill-Burton as a service-provision vehicle. As an elected body, Congress
was presumably more responsive than the courts or government agencies to
testimony in hearings, which cited examples of hospitals' failure to comply with
the regulations and of indigent persons with urgent medical needs being turned
away despite Hill-Burton eligibility. In the course of the hearings, witnesses and
representatives criticized DHEW and the state agencies for their lack of
enforcement of the regulations that had existed since 1972. ' The emotional
spectre of poor persons who had been denied medical care through facility
noncompliance and agency callousness may have been a factor in Congress'
decision to ratify the course of the Act's development.
A somewhat more sophisticated speculation would grant that at least some
members of Congress understood that the original Act had never been intended
as a service-provision statute, but were not displeased with its development in
that direction. The regulations, in effect, had grown into a privately funded
source of medical care for indigents who were not Medicare or Medicaid

164. An individual could file a complaint with DHEW charging facility noncompliance;
if the Secretary dismissed the complaint or the Attorney General did not bring an action
within the six-month period, the complainant could then initiate legal action. Id. Whether
this administrative process was a condition precedent to suit under Title VI was the
subject of rulings in later cases. See notes 191 & 220 and accompanying text infra.
165. See Rosenblatt, supra note 22, at 285; cf. 11 CONN. L. REV. 248, 251 (1979)
(Congressional dissatisfaction with enforcement of and compliance with Act prompted
enactment of Title XVI).
166. See S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7845.
167. Id. at 7899-7900.
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eligible. ' Thus, continuation of the uncompensated care requirements cost the
government nothing and could serve to relieve some pressure for expansion of
Medicare or Medicaid benefits, which would have required additional government expenditure. Moreover, the community service obligation, which required
Hill-Burton hospitals to accept Medicare and Medicaid patients,'69 had the effect
of broadening acceptability of the programs.
Such an economic analysis would have made Title XVI, and its implied
ratification of Title VI's development, an attractive package for Congress. It
allowed the government to continue to reap the benefits that had evolved,
however unexpectedly, from grants under the original Act. Since no further
money was to be spent under Title VI, the benefits of the ongoing "return" of
privately funded uncompensated care were costless to the 1975 Congress. ' At
the same time, a vote to fund hospitals under Title XVI was a vote "for"
improved health care for the poor at only a fraction of the cost of a government
program to that end: Title XVI facilities, it will be remembered, had no
twenty-year time limitation on their obligations, and the return on that initial
government investment could, theoretically, extend forever.
This statutory scheme made Title XVI funding very unattractive to hospitals, which could borrow money from commercial lenders with less attendant
regulation and at finite interest rates. The point was mooted, however, by the
appropriations for Title XVI, which funded only the portion of the new Act that
assisted public hospitals in complying with safety and accreditation standards."'
Because no private nonprofit hospital has received funding under Title XVI,
its impact has been limited to the changes it made that apply to hospitals that
received Hill-Burton aid under the now unfunded Title VI program.
In Title XVI, despite its disapproval of DHEW's Hill-Burton enforcement
record, Congress vested total regulatory control in the agency, apparently
believing that enforcement would improve if it were centralized in an agency
accountable directly to Congress. Despite this belief and despite the terms of the
new Act requiring the Secretary to draft new regulations for Title VI and XVI
facilities,"' DHEW delayed in issuing new regulations and the 1972 regulations,
as amended in response to Cook IH and Corum II, remained in effect.
168. Based on the receipt of their Title VI grants or loans, hospitals were obligated to
fund a continuing volume of uncompensated care for a specified period, 20 years from
receipt of a grant or, in the case of a loan, while it remained unpaid. See 37 Fed. Reg.
14,719, 14,720 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972, codified at 42 C.F.R. §
53.111(a) (1978)). Medicare and Medicaid made no contribution to offset these costs; such
services were funded by increased charges to other patients or by other outside means. See
notes 53 to 56 and accompanying text supra.
169. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766, 31,767 (final regulations of Aug. 30, 1974, codified at 42
C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(2) (1976)).
170. That is, construction and modernization appropriations made through the Act
continued to prompt Title VI facilities' delivery of uncompensated care and community
service for 20 years after receipt of a grant or until the balance of a Hill-Burton loan was
paid.
171. See AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43, at 6.
172. 42 U.S.C. §300o-1 (1976).
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FurtherRegulatory Development

As Congress considered Title XVI, the attack on the uncompensated care
and community service regulations continued in the familiar forum of Cook v.
Ochsner FoundationHospital, which had been reactivated by plaintiffs' filing of
yet another amended complaint. "3 In Cook III, the plaintiffs reiterated the
charge that the entire body of regulations was invalid because the Federal
Hospital Council's authority was unconstitutional.'74 They also repeated the
challenge to the substantive validity of the time limitation and presumptive
compliance guidelines of the uncompensated care regulations.'7 In addition, the
plaintiffs charged that the time limitation on the community service regulation
was invalid under Title VI.17'
The court agreed with the analysis of the Corum II decision'77 and held that
the Council's role in the promulgation of regulations was constitutionally
valid. "' It expanded on the Corum II ruling, however, by holding that the
presumptive compliance guidelines and the time limitation in the uncompensated care regulations were valid generally, because the provisions resulted in a
regulatory scheme that was reasonable under Title VI. 79 In so holding, the court

173. Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975). See Cook II, 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La.
1972) (Hill-Burton hospitals may not discriminate against Medicaid patients), notes 120 to
132 and accompanying text supra; Cook 1, 319 F. Supp. 603 (ED. La. 1970) (indigent
plaintiffs have private cause of action under the Act), notes 59 to 62 and accompanying
text supra.
174. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook III), Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March
12, 1975), at 1. The challenge to the authority of the Federal Hospital Council was made
under the same theory of unlawful delegation of legislative power to a private body that
had been pursued and rejected in Corum II, 373 F. Supp. 550, 551-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See
notes 140 to 144 and accompanying text supra. Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300o-300t (1976),
had been enacted three months before this decision, see text accompanying notes 157 to
172 supra, but DHEW had not yet promulgated new regulations under the Act. Thus,
although the role of the Federal Hospital Council in the promulgation of new regulations
had been removed through Title XVI, its authority continued so long as the old regulations
pertaining to Title VI remained in effect.
The Cook III complaint also alleged conflict of interest of some members of the
Federal Hospital Council who were administrators of Hill-Burton hospitals. The court
rejected this claim, see Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975), at 4-5, and its ruling
was upheld on appeal. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 968, 974-75 (5th Cir.
1977). See note 142 supra.
175. Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975), at 1. These issues had been raised in
Corum 11, 373 F. Supp. 550, 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See notes 145 to 150 and
accompanying text supra.
176. Civ. No. 70-1969, at 1. The time limitation had been attached to the community
service regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766 (final regulations of Aug. 30, 1974, codified in 42
C.F.R. § 53.113 (1976)), which had been promulgated in response to Cook I. See 61 F.R.D.
354 (E.D. La. 1972), notes 120 to 132 and accompanying text supra.
177. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see text accompanying notes 139 to 144 supra.
178. Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975), at 2-4.
179. Id. at 6-9. Corum II had limited its approval of the terms of the uncompensated
care regulation to the application of the regulations to the defendant hospital in that case.
See notes 148 to 150 and accompanying text supra.
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recognized that the terms of the uncompensated care regulations permitted
recipient hospitals to avoid a "financial burden bearing no reasonable relationship to the amount of federal aid."'' "
Turning to the time limitation on the community service regulation,
however, the court stated that it did not impose a financial burden on hospitals
and struck down the provision, finding that the durational limit created an
"imbalance between popular need and [hospital] need which is inconsistent with
legislative aim, and, therefore, impermissible."''
Cook III was correct in determining that the community service time
limitation was in derogation of the statutory purpose, but misunderstood that
the original Hill-Burton Act had sought only to provide facilities to meet
"popular need." That is, although Title VI had funded hospitals on the condition
that they would remain available to all people in the surrounding area, the 1946
Congress could not have anticipated that the community service requirement
would be construed in conjunction with the later-enacted Medicare and Medicaid
programs. By failing to consider the financial interrelationships between
Hill-Burton and these programs, the court came to the mistaken conclusion that
the community service requirements did not impose a financial burden on
hospitals. In fact, when a Hill-Burton facility accepted Medicare or Medicaid
patients, as it was now required to do under the community service obligation, it
lost revenue to fund its uncompensated care obligation, 2 and lost the difference
between its usual charge and the government's payment rate.' 3 In addition,
under the Hill-Burton program's reasonable cost crediting standard, the hospital
was required to render more service in order to meet its uncompensated care
obligation."
That the Cook III court did not understand these issues is further illustrated
by its characterization of the relationship between the community service
requirement and the uncompensated care crediting mechanism. The court noted:
"the [community service] regulation itself requires that [facilities] arrange for
reimbursement of full community service costs . . . at reasonable cost ....
Any cost not reimbursed conceivably could be applied by the facility toward its

180. Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975), at 8. This ruling was upheld on
plaintiffs' appeal. 555 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977).

181. Civ. No. 70-1969, at 6.
182. As explained previously, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement do not contribute
to the funding of uncompensated care. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra;
note 323 infra. When treating patients under these programs, as a Hill-Burton facility was
required to do per force of the community service obligation, the burden of financing
uncompensated care was placed on the hospital, which, in turn, either drew upon its
general endowment or passed increased costs along in the form of higher rates.
183. See notes 52 to 56 and accompanying text supra.

184. The same "reasonable cost" reimbursement rate paid by Medicare and Medicaid
applied when a hospital sought Hill-Burton credit for treatment of a patient under its
obligation; Hill-Burton credit was allowed only to the extent that the government would
have reimbursed for the service had the patient been eligible, not on the basis of the
hospital's usual charge for the service. See notes 52 to 56 and accompanying text supra.

19791

THE HILL-BURTON ACT

requisite 'reasonable volume' of uncompensated care."'' 5 This statement revealed
a fundamental misunderstanding of the Hill-Burton regulations, which specifically prohibited the crediting of the difference between reasonable cost reimbursement and hospital charges.' 6 Despite the fact that the Cook III court's
decision to strike down the community service time limitation was based, at
least in part, on this misconception, DHEW did not appeal the ruling.'87
In September 1975 another challenge to the regulations was faced in
Gordon v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority,' a class action in which the court
agreed with the holding of Corum II regarding the prior determination of
patient eligibility. 9 In denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
their individual claims of entitlement to uncompensated care under the Act,
however, the court found that the new administrative procedures portion of Title
XVI applied to complaints based on Title VI facilities' compliance and held that
the plaintiffs were required to exhaust remedies in a complaint proceeding to
the Secretary of DHEW prior to seeking judicial relief."°
The court also dealt with several other claims that had not been submitted
in previous cases. First, the plaintiffs attacked the priority system used by
Forsyth Memorial Hospital to dispense Hill-Burton care. The hospital used a
triage system, which gave priority to the most severe medical problems over the
course of the year until the Hill-Burton obligation was met.'9 ' The plaintiffs
claimed that, under the Act, care should be dispensed on a "first-come,
first-serve" basis regardless of the severity of the medical problem.'92 On this
issue, the court came to the correct conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to
revise the hospital's system because its evaluation was the responsibility of the
supervising state and federal administrative agencies."
185. Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March 12, 1975), at 9 (emphasis added).
186. See note 92 and accompanying text supra; see also Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
453 F. Supp. 401, 419 (M.D. Tenn. 1978); note 234 and accompanying text infra.
187. See note 156 supra (possible explanations for DHEW's failure to appeal district
court decisions affecting Hill-Burton regulations).
188. 409 F. Supp. 708 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The court had before it cross motions for
summary judgment and plaintiffs' motion for class certification, which was granted, id. at
717-18.
189. Id. at 723-24 (quoting Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Corum 11), 373 F.
Supp. 550, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
190. Id. at 721-22 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) (1976)). See note 164 and accompanying text supra.
191. 409 F. Supp. at 722.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 722-23. The court invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which is
properly applied in instances in which a court is presented with a problem that may most
appropriately be given over to agency expertise for initial determination. It governs the
court's decision whether the court or the administrative agency should make the initial
decision or finding of fact. See id. at 722 n.12 (quoting. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 19.09, at 53 (rev. ed. 1958)). Plaintiffs asserted that agency unresponsiveness to
their objections made application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine inappropriate. The
court held, however, that the opportunity to raise objections to the hospital's plan for
distribution of services was presented by the state agency's annual review of the hospital's
services, and that plaintiffs should first pursue this course of action. Id. at 723.
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The plaintiffs also challenged, on equal protection grounds, Forsyth's
system of transferring non-acute care patients from its facility to another
affiliated hospital, which was not a Hill-Burton grantee. Upon transfer to the
non-grantee hospital, patients were no longer eligible for uncompensated care.' 4
The plaintiffs claimed that under this system, which operated at the discretion
of Forsyth physicians, the classification of patients to be transferred, and thus
deprived of Hill-Burton benefits, was arbitrary and bore no rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest.'95 The court agreed, finding that HillBurton funding imbued Forsyth's acts with state action,'1 and ordering the
917
hospital to formulate a written transfer policy.'

194. The system, which was designed to meet demands for acute-care bed space at
Forsyth, resulted in the transfer of less seriously ill or recovering patients from Forsyth to
another hospital that was less acute-care oriented. Id. at 726.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964)). In stating that there was "no question" that
Hill-Burton funding triggered a state action characterization of defendant's acts, the court
was somewhat conclusory. Although Simkins and several other early Hill-Burton cases
had held that the receipt of Hill-Burton funds was sufficient to imbue defendant hospitals'
acts with state action, the Supreme Court's holdings in subsequent cases altered that
perception. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (mere
state regulation does not constitute state action; inquiry is whether there is sufficiently
close nexus between state and challenged action of regulated entity); Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-79 (1972) (same; state licensure insufficient). The Court's
previous holding in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), however,
has created some confusion as to the appropriate test for state action. The Court found that
the symbiotic relationship between the state and a private party engaged in discrimination made the state a joint participant in the discriminatory acts. Id. at 721-26. This has
been termed the "overall relationship" theory of state action. See Greene v. The Johns
Hopkins Univ., 469 F. Supp. 187, 195 (D. Md. 1979). Following Jackson, a number of
courts adopted a three-pronged test to determine if Hill-Burton hospitals' acts or omissions
constituted state action, viz: (1) significant government involvement in the hospital's
operation (e.g., government management or major funding); (2) nexus between the
government's involvement and the complained-of action or omission (e.g., refusal to admit
or treat); (3) finding that the government's acts resulted in or provoked the complained of
action or omission (e.g., admissions or discharge policy). See, e.g., Jackson v. NortonChildren's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Greene v. The Johns
Hopkins Univ., 469 F. Supp. 187, 197 (D. Md. 1979) (student cannot support claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 with Hill-Burton funding of university hospital; no state action found
under either overall relationship theory of Wilmington Parking Authority or close nexus
theory of Moose Lodge).

Because Forsyth Memorial Hospital was a public hospital controlled by a county
authority, the characterization of state action by the court was correct under either test
enunciated by the Supreme Court, but not, as stated by the court, simply by virtue of the
hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton funds. See generally 11 CONN. L. R'v. 248, 260-64 (1979).
197. 409 F. Supp. at 727. Forsyth was also ordered to submit the plan to the state
Hill-Burton agency and to DHEW for their approval, and to submit the plan and the
agencies' comments to the court. Although Title XVI had vested total regulatory authority
in DHEW, see note 161 and accompanying text supra. since DHEW had yet to issue any
regulations under the new Act, the supervisory role of the state Hill-Burton agencies
continued with regard to Title VI facilities.
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Using Goldberg v. Kelly by way of analogy, the court also found that the
current regulations' requirement of newspaper announcements was inadequate
to provide effective notice of the availability of uncompensated services to
potential Hill-Burton patients.'98 Although conceding that the Act did not
require that all members of the public have "actual notice of the benefits
available," the court referred to the text of the posted notice that was contained
in the proposed uncompensated care regulations that DHEW had proposed;'" the
court added some clarifying language to the text of the proposed notice and
ordered Forsyth to post such notices immediately, before DHEW's regulations
became effective.'
By this implicit due process order, albeit unstated and limited to the
defendant hospital,"' the Gordon court forestalled any attempt by DHEW to
22
weaken the posted notice requirement in its forthcoming final regulations. 0
Furthermore, the order, in combination with the specific state action and equal
protection holdings on the transfer of patients issue, added a constitutional
dimension to the delivery of care through the Hill-Burton program. This was
another step in the Act's development, as the holdings rested on a notion of
potential beneficiaries' entitlement to certain procedural safeguards. In addition, the Gordon complaint illustrated the exactness with which plaintiffs were
seeking interpretation of the Act: From the original general language of the
statute mandating a "reasonable volume" of uncompensated services, plaintiffs
were seeking invalidation of the method that a hospital used to distribute such
care and proposing that the Act had implied another system.

198. 409 F. Supp. at 725 (citing 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
199. Id. (emphasis in original) (referring to 40 Fed. Reg. 10,686 (proposed regulations
of March 7, 1975)). See notes 152 to 154 supra. The issuance had been prompted by Corum
v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Corum I), 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
200. 409 F. Supp. at 725. The plaintiffs pursued this issue and the district court's
holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was required prior to judicial
intervention. Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 554 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1976)
(affirmance of district court).
201. 409 F. Supp. at 725. The court said that such notice was "necessary as a practical
matter, to the implementation of the purpose and goal of the Hill-Burton Act in making
available a reasonable volume of medical services to persons unable to pay therefor."
202. Although DHEW was not a defendant in the Gordon case, this order was
obviously intended to influence the agency's regulatory process. Because DHEW had not
yet drafted new regulations under Title XVI for Title VI facilities, the Federal Hospital
Council continued to have authority over Title VI regulations. Rose, supra note 2,
indicates that there was reason for concern that the Federal Hospital Council would act to
diminish the requirements of the March proposed posted notice regulation before its
finalization. In a May 1975 meeting, the Council had voted to require posted notice only of
facilities that had failed to achieve their presumptive compliance percentage minimum. Id.
at 193 n.143. Without the court's pointed ruling concerning Forsyth, it appears that this
change would have gone into effect in the final regulations.
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In July 1976 the court in Lugo v. Simon (Lugo 1) agreed with Cook III that
the statute implied no time limitation on the community service obligation.2 " It
also concurred in the Corum II and Cook III holdings that the uncompensated
care obligation could properly be limited in both quantity (the presumptive
compliance level) and duration (the time limitation).'
Thus, by the multiple decisions of four federal courts, DHEW was prompted
to amend the uncompensated care and community service regulations. Final
uncompensated care regulations were issued in October 1975 and stated to be
effective on the date of issuance."2 These regulations made effective the new
prior determination of patient eligibility standard2 as ordered by the 1974
Corum II decision 20 7 and suggested by the 1975 ruling in Gordon v. Forsyth
County Hospital Authority"' and the posted notice requirements 29 as also
21
discussed in the Gordon case.
The deletion of the time limitation on facilities' community service
obligations was not accomplished by final regulation until March 1977,11 some
two years after Cook III had found the provision invalid, 22 and nine months after
21 3
the Lugo I decision to that same effect.
Enforcement Development through Litigation
At this point, having elicited judicial interpretation of virtually every
section of the Hill-Burton regulations, plaintiffs' groups focused their attacks on
the lack of agency enforcement and hospital compliance. Records of state and
federal enforcement of the 1972 regulations and their amendments showed
inattention to compliance, despite the repeated litigation. In large part, it

203. 426 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The plaintiffs sued several area hospitals,
alleging their failure to provide treatment of indigents as required by the regulations, and
sought to compel the Ohio Department of Health and DHEW to enforce the hospitals'
obligations. This case was heard on DHEW's motion to dismiss or grant summary
judgment and plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 30-31.
204. Id. at 34-36.
205. 40 Fed. Reg. 46,202 (final regulations of Oct. 6, 1975, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 53.111(f), (i) (1978)).
206. Id. at 46,203 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f) (1978)). An exception to the prior
determination requirement was made for medical emergencies. In the event that
emergency service was rendered prior to a determination, however, it was required that
the bill sent for the service contain a notice of Hill-Burton care availability similar in text
to the posted notice. Id.
207. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
208. See text accompanying note 195 supra.
209. 40 Fed. Reg. 46,202, 46,203 (final regulations of Oct. 6, 1975, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 53.111(i) (1978)).
210. See text accompanying notes 198 to 200 and accompanying text supra.
211. 42 Fed. Reg. 16,780 (final regulations of March 30, 1977, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 53.113(a) (1978)).
212. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
213. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
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appeared that DHEW's amenable rewriting of its regulations at the behest of
the federal courts was the sum of its efforts toward Hill-Burton change."'
Two recent Hill-Burton actions not only challenged specific regulatory
provisions, but also targeted hospital noncompliance and government failure to
enforce its Hill-Burton requirements. 15 These cases resulted in further expansion of the Hill-Burton program's service provision requirements.
As previously discussed, the decision in Lugo v. Simon (Lugo ) declared
invalid the time limitation on the community service regulation." 6 An amended
complaint charged officials of the Ohio Department of Health and DHEW with
failing to enforce Ohio hospitals' compliance with Title VI Hill-Burton
regulations and sought an injunction to compel DHEW to issue new regulations
for Title VI facilities as directed by Title XVI.217
In Lugo II, the confusion surrounding the effect of Title XVI on Title VI
prompted the state and federal agency defendants to file accusatory cross-claims
against each other. The state health department, claiming that under Title XVI
it no longer had authority to enforce the uncompensated care or community
service obligation, blamed the lack of enforcement on the Secretary's failure to
promulgate regulations under the new statute. DHEW countered by contending
that the state's claims constituted an admission of its past and planned failure to
adhere to the Title VI regulations and accused the Ohio agency of having
submitted a state plan for hospital compliance that was "'ambiguous, vague,
and confusing in certain areas, and [which] has not been modified to incorporate
21
explicitly. . . [required] regulatory amendments subsequent to its adoption.'
Although the agencies had in their claims against each other implicitly
admitted enforcement failure,219 the court held that the plaintiffs were required

214. For many examples of federal and state agency failure to monitor or enforce the
Hill-Burton requirements from 1972 through 1975, see Rose, supra note 2, at 181-94. This
author's 1978 review of Maryland state agency Hill-Burton records suggests that the
patterns described by Rose continued at least through that year. The explanation given
most frequently by state agencies for failure to monitor or enforce the regulations was lack
of funds for manpower to do so. See id. at 191.
215. Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978); Lugo v. Simon
(Lugo 1), 453 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (continuation, on amended complaint, of Lugo
I, 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976)).
216. 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
217. Lugo v. Simon (LugoI), 453 F. Supp. 677, 684-86 (N.D. Ohio 1978). Nearly three
years after the passage of the "new" Hill-Burton Act, DHEW had yet to promulgate the
new regulations it required. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
218. 453 F. Supp. at 682. Although it was the federal agency's statutory responsibility
to evaluate and approve states' plans, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c, 291d (1976); see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300o-1 to -3, 300p-2 (1976), this was apparently. DHEW's first expression of
dissatisfaction with the Ohio plan since its 1974 approval.
219. Partial summary judgment on the statutory interpretation issue was granted to
DHEW, however, in that the Ohio Department of Health was ordered to modify its state
plan in accordance with the applicable Title VI regulations, and to implement and enforce
both the plan and the federal regulations. 453 F. Supp. at 691-92. In reaching this
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to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in Title XV.220 On plaintiffs'
motion to compel DHEW to draft regulations, the court, although extremely
critical of the agency's inactivity since the 1975 enactment, nonetheless stopped
short of issuing an injunction, apparently because of DHEW's assertion that new
regulations were "under development."22 '
Four months after Lugo II, the opinion in Newsom v.Vanderbilt University2 2 was announced. This last case to rule on interpretation and enforcement
issues under the Title VI regulations has become a landmark among Hill-Burton
decisions because of its definitive holdings. The class action suit, instituted
against Vanderbilt University Hospital, the Tennessee Department of Public
Health, and DHEW, first attacked the validity of the time limitation on the
uncompensated care obligation as it applied to the defendant hospital. The
plaintiffs also alleged that the hospital had failed to fulfill its uncompensated
service obligation, and, alternatively, that even if such services had been
provided, the hospital's procedures for their distribution failed to afford
procedural due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 3 Newsom
also charged that the federal and state agencies had failed to fulfill their duties
to enforce the Hill-Burton Act and regulations, and asserted that all the
defendants had acted under color of state law to deprive her of her rights under
the Act and the Constitution. "4
The threshold question facing the court was the effect that the administrative determination would have on its adjudication. This was a question of first
impression under Title XVI. Newsom's administrative complaint had been
dismissed by DHEW with a finding that Vanderbilt was in "substantial
compliance" with its Hill-Burton uncompensated care obligation.2 2 As the

decision, the court correctly reasoned that nothing in the new Title XVI had invalidated
the regulatory responsibilities of the state under the Title VI regulations, and noted that
the fact that Title VI funding had ceased did not alter the states' responsibilities to enforce
the regulations against facilities that had received such funds in the past. Id. at 683.
220. The court required exhaustion although the plaintiffs had filed suit prior to
enactment of Title XVI, finding that no "'manifest injustice'" would result from this
action. The court also found that although Title XVI did not specify that exhaustion was
required prior to filing a claim against a state agency, it would require such exhaustion in
concert with exhaustion of the claims against the hospital and federal defendants. Id. at
683-85 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) (1976)).
221. Id. at 686. The court refused to grant DHEW's motion for summary judgment
against the plaintiffs on the issue of injunctive relief, however, and scheduled a new trial
for its resolution. This issue was resolved by a consent decree in which DHEW agreed to
issue regulations under Title XVI within a specific time period. See Lugo v. Simon, Civ.
No. 74-345 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 1978) (stipulation between plaintiffs and DHEW). The
defendant hospitals were not parties to this consent decree.
222. 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
223. Id. at 410.
224. Id. at 405.
225. Id. at 406-09. The court said: "The term 'substantial evidence' is not to be found
in [the Act], nor is the phrase 'arbitrary and capricious,' nor are any other terms that
connote limited review." Id. at 407.
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administrative procedures section of Title XVI did not specify the effect of an
agency decision, the court was forced to employ analogy and the canons of
statutory construction to determine the proper standard. After detailed comparison of the Hill-Burton's administrative procedures section with similar provisions of other statutes, the court concluded that the statute required a trial de
novo rather than mere judicial review of the Secretary's determination." 6 That
is, the court's decision would be based on the entire record before the court,
rather than solely on the evidence before DHEW in its decision in favor of
Vanderbilt. This was an extremely important ruling because the plaintiffs'
claims were dependent on their ability to present evidence that contradicted
DHEW's conclusionsY
The Newsom court addressed the validity of the time limitation on the
uncompensated care obligation, particularly as applied to older facilities, like
Vanderbilt, that had received grants in the early stages of the Hill-Burton
program.' The plaintiffs argued that the time limitation was intended to
require a facility's provision of service for a twenty-year period. Because
Vanderbilt had provided uncompensated service, if at all, only in years
subsequent to the 1972 regulations, it should not receive "credit" for the years
between the completion of its Hill-Burton building and that time.' Agreeing
with previous rulings that had upheld the validity of the uncompensated care
time limitation under the Act,23 the court considered how the twenty-year
period should properly be calculated. In essence, the court found, it would be
impossible to determine a hospital's compliance for the period prior to the 1972
uncompensated care regulations, as no standards for compliance with the
requirement existed during that time. Arguably, proof of Vanderbilt's noncompliance could invalidate the twenty-year time limit as it applied to the facility;
however, the plaintiffs had an impossible burden on this issue. 23 '

226. In deciding that de novo review was required, the court examined the
administrative procedure language of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) (1976), and
compared it with similar provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),
(f)(1)
(1976), and other sections of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. § 300s (1976). 453 F. Supp. at
407-08. It noted that use of the de novo standard did not mean the agency's action was
insignificant; it was considered on its merits as a part of the evidentiary record. Id. at 406.
227. If the court had found itself limited to the review standards of "arbitrary and
capricious," "clearly erroneous," or "substantial evidence," it would have been confined to
an examination of the administrative record of the DHEW decision. As noted in the court's
decision, some of the evidence before the court "contradict[ed] the factual basis assigned by
the Secretary for his finding of Vanderbilt's compliance." Id. at 409.
228. Id. at 410-13. See note 229 infra.
229. 453 F. Supp. at 410. It was stipulated that Vanderbilt had received seven
Hill-Burton grants, totalling approximately $3 million, between 1957 and 1971. Id. at 404.
230. Id. at 410 (citing Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977)
(affirmance of uncompensated care time limitation holding of Cook III, Civ. No. 70-1969
(E.D. La. March 12, 1975)); Lugo v. Simon (Lugo 1), 426 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Corum 1I), 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
231. 453 F. Supp. at 410-13. This legally correct conclusion illustrated the inextricable
box that the twenty-year time limit had created for plaintiffs.
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In evaluating Vanderbilt's uncompensated care compliance since the
inauguration of standards, however, the court found that the hospital had been
delinquent in important respects. First, contrary to the regulations promulgated
in response to the 1974 order in Corum 1I,32 Vanderbilt had never properly
implemented the requirement of prior determination of patient eligibility.
Consequently, it had been improperly crediting certain types of services toward
its Hill-Burton obligation."a Vanderbilt had also been calculating its HillBurton credit on the basis of its charges for services, not the reasonable cost
principles specified in the regulations.3 In an order unprecedented in the
Hill-Burton cases, the court enjoined such improper crediting2" and ordered the
hospital to make up the deficit incurred by its actions by providing increased
uncompensated care in the future."6 It also enjoined the state and federal agency
defendants from finding Vanderbilt to be in compliance with the uncompensated
care obligation on the basis of reports that did not reflect actual compliance with
the Act and the current regulations."7 In addition, Vanderbilt was ordered to
improve its reporting to the state agency and DHEW,2 and to refrain from
collection efforts against any patients treated after 1972 who would have
qualified for Hill-Burton care.'
These holdings graphically illustrated the different standards of review and
enforcement employed by DHEW and the federal courts. While DHEW had
found Vanderbilt to be in "substantial compliance" with its Hill-Burton
uncompensated care obligation, the court, acting on much the same evidence
that had been presented in the administrative complaint, came to the opposite
conclusion.' The court's compliance determination, and its specific order to
Vanderbilt to "pay back" its uncompensated care "deficit," illustrated HillBurton's development: Not only was the holding based on detailed regulatory
provisions that had not been contemplated by Congress or recipient facilities,

232. See Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center (Corum I), 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), which prompted the issuance of new uncompensated care regulations, 40 Fed. Reg.
46,202 (final regulations of Oct. 6, 1975, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f) (1978)).
233. 453 F. Supp. at 415. Vanderbilt claimed that it had never received the September
1974 memorandum from DHEW, and had not implemented any change in its accounting
procedures until April 1975. Further, the court found that after the issuance of the final
billing and notice regulations in October 1975, Vanderbilt had not included the required
notice in bills for emergency treatment rendered prior to the determination of eligibility.
Id. at 416.
234. Id. at 418-19. The parties agreed that the "reasonable cost" reimbursement
would, on average, have been 75% of the hospital's charge. In addition, when treating
Medicaid or Medicare patients, Vanderbilt had been crediting the difference in charges
over reasonable cost toward the Hill-Burton obligation. This was an additional violation of
the regulations. See notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text supra.
235. 453 F. Supp. at 430.
236. Id. at 419.
237. Id. at 430.
238. Id. at 419.
239. Id. at 430.
240. See note 227 supra.
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but the court enforced those provisions in a manner that could not have been
foreseen.
The Newsom case also built on the foundation of procedural due process that
had been implied by Gordon v.Forsyth County Hospital Authority.4 ' In this
branch of the case, the court relied upon Vanderbilt's receipt of Hill-Burton
funds, its regulation by other state and federal agencies, and its role (as
specified by state statute) as an agent of the State of Tennessee to find that the
facility's patient care activities constituted state and federal action.24 ' Like the
Gordon court, the Newsom court relied on Goldberg v. Kelly, ' but whereas the
former decision was limited to the implication that due process required the
2
posting of notices to advise patients of the availability of uncompensated care, "
the Newsom court determined that potential beneficiaries of Hill-Burton had a
property interest that was protected by due process requirements, and held that
the Supreme Court's definition of due process in Goldberg v. Kelly meant that
indigent persons were entitled to actual notice of their potential eligibility for
uncompensated care.245 Not only was posted notice insufficient, but due process
required "notice . . .of the written eligibility criteria upon which the hospital
will base its determination to furnish or withhold treatment," "timely and
adequate written notice detailing the reasons for the proposed denial of benefits,
review by a decision-maker who has not participated in making the initial
finding of ineligibility, and a written statement of the reasons for the decision
and the evidence relied thereon."", Furthermore, individuals must "be given an
effective opportunity to present affirmative evidence and to refute adverse
evidence, though not necessarily at an oral hearing." '
As noted by one commentator, the Newsom court's reliance on Goldberg v.
Kelly was somewhat misplaced. ' In that case, the Supreme Court determined
241. 409 F. Supp. 708, 725 (M.D.N.C. 1975); see notes 198 to 202 and accompanying
text supra.
242. 453 F. Supp. at 419-22. In order to impose the due process requirements of the
fourteenth and fifth amendments on Vanderbilt's distribution of Hill-Burton services,
these activities were required to be shown to constitute state and federal action. See 11
CONN. L. REV. 248, 260-64 (1979) (questions basis, although not ultimate result, of court's
state action finding). Cf. note 196 supra (applicable tests for state action determination).
243. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
244. See Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 708, 725 (M.D.N.C.
1975); notes 198 to 202 and accompanying text supra.
245. 453 F. Supp. at 423-24.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 11 CONN. L. REV. 248, 264-68 (1979). As noted in this analysis of the Newsom
case, "[clourts have disagreed on whether Goldberg-type procedural safeguards are
required before application for government benefits may be denied." Id. at 265-66
(emphasis added) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (implication that
present enjoyment of benefits, not mere eligibility for benefits, is necessary to invoke due
process protections); Baker Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976) (due
process protections attach upon application for welfare benefits); Scarpa v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (due process attaches when government seeks to
deprive individual of goods, rights or privileges which he already possesses)).
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that welfare beneficiaries could not be subject to the state's termination of their
payments without the notice and hearing protections of procedural due
process." 9 In Goldberg v. Kelly the protected property interest of the plaintiffs
was their ongoing receipt of benefits from the state.m The interest of the
Newsom plaintiffs, on the other hand, was potential and uncertain because of
the structure of the Hill-Burton regulations. First, no individual could ever be
assured of receiving Hill-Burton care so long as the regulations permitted a
hospital the discretion of allocating its care throughout the facility and among
patients according to any reasonable system approved by the administrative
agencies. 5' Second, if a hospital had elected a presumptive compliance percentage minimum, rather than the open door option, its uncompensated care
obligation was limited by its annual percentage minimum; after that figure was
achieved, the hospital had no further obligation to dispense uncompensated care
to anyone until the next fiscal year.252 Given these facts, the determination that
the Newsom plaintiffs had a property interest in Hill-Burton benefits expanded
considerably upon Goldberg v. Kelly.'
Newsom v. Vanderbilt University was the apex of Hill-Burton's development

in the courts. Five months after the decision, DHEW issued proposed regulations
under Title XVI that dealt with the uncompensated care and community service
requirements for both Title VI and Title XVI facilities.' After extensive public
comment, final regulations were issued in May 1979, to be effective in
September 1979.255 The American Hospital Association filed suit in June to seek
invalidation of the regulations, and later sought to enjoin their issuance in final

249. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
250. Id. at 262.
251. See Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 708, 722-23 (M.D.N.C.
1975), notes 191 to 193 and accompanying text supra; Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center (Corum 1), 359 F. Supp. 909, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), notes 113 to 118 and
accompanying text supra.
252. See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,722 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972,
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h) (1978)).
253. The Newsom plaintiffs "property interest" in Hill-Burton benefits resembles the
"expected" or "future" benefits of Roth or Baker Chaput, see note 248 supra, much more
than the present property interests of the plaintiffs in Goldberg. In fact, because of the
factors apart from eligibility that govern the distribution of Hill-Burton care, the nature of
the "property interest" is even more attenuated than those articulated in the former cases.
254. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (proposed regulations of Oct. 25, 1978).
255. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (final regulations of May 18, 1979, codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.501-607 (1979)). See Appendix I: Summary of Public Comments and Department's
Actions on the Uncompensated Services and Community Service Regulations, id. at
29,382-399.
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form."6 The AHA motions were denied,
effective on September 1, 1979.11

7

359

and the new regulations became

Comprehensive Regulatory Change
The 1979 Hill-Burton regulations are the result of comprehensive redrafting
of prior provisions, but they also reflect many of the judicial, legislative, and
administrative interpretations of the 1972-1978 period. The new issuance is so
detailed as to defy easy summary, but highlights of the major changes show the
magnitude of their impact on Title VI hospitals. The uncompensated care
regulations affect some 3,600 hospitals with balances remaining on their time
obligations, and the community service regulations apply to all facilities that
ever received Title VI funds. 9
A.

The 1979 Uncompensated Care Regulations

Under the 1979 regulations, major conceptual changes have occurred in the
definition of the amount of uncompensated care due from recipient hospitals.
First, the new regulations eliminate entirely the "open door" compliance option
which had been in effect since the 1972 regulations and which had been the
chosen compliance option of most Hill-Burton hospitals.2" A Title VI facility
must now elect one of the presumptive compliance minimums, either three
256. See AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43. See also Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, No.
79-C2669 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 24, 1979), referred to in American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris,
477 F. Supp. 665, 666 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
257. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 477 F. Supp. 665, 666, 669 (N.D. Il.1979).
258. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (preface to final regulations of May 18, 1979). Facilities
beginning a new fiscal year before that date could implement the requirements at an
earlier date. For all facilities beginning their fiscal years after September 1, 1979, the
regulations took effect at that time.
259. See id. at 29,372, 29,399 n.3 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979). The
time limitation on Title VI facilities, as established by previous regulations, remains in
effect. More than 5,000 Title VI facilities still fall under the time limitation of the
uncompensated care requirement, but approximately 1,400 are nursing homes, out-patient
clinics, or other types of health facilities.
As in the prior regulations, there is no time limitation on Title VI facilities'
community service obligation in the 1979 regulations. The community service regulation
has not been so limited since the 1977 regulatory revision prompted by Cook III's holding
that the limitation was in derogation of statutory intent. See note 181 and accompanying
text supra.
The 1979 regulations also apply to Title XVI-funded facilities but, as specified in
the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 300o-3(b)(J) (1976), facilities funded by Title XVI have no time
limitation on their uncompensated care or community service obligations. The terms of the
1979 regulations that refer only to Title XVI facilities are of no consequence to private,
non-profit hospitals, however; according to the American Hospital Association, no such
hospital has received Title XVI funding. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
260. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,384-86 (Appendix I to
final regulations of May 18, 1979). See also notes 86, 87 & 108 and accompanying text
supra.
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percent of annual operating costs or ten percent of the amount of the Hill-Burton
grant, and supply care to that level." In another fundamental change, a
hospital's obligation is now couched in terms of a total volume of services due
over the length of time of its uncompensated care obligation. That is, although a
hospital's obligation is fulfilled according to an annual presumptive compliance
minimum, annual deficits and excesses are carried forward from year to year. 62
If at the end of its obligation period a facility "owes" uncompensated care
because of previous shortfalls, it must continue to provide uncompensated care
until its total volume is satisfied. By the same token, by exceeding successive
annual compliance quotas, a facility may "buy out" of its obligation, and need no
longer supply any uncompensated care. Finally, in direct contravention of the
language of Title VI, the new regulations eliminate the financial infeasibility
waiver whereby a hospital could seek an exemption or reduction of its
uncompensated care obligation because of financial hardship."
With the elimination of the open door and waiver options, all grantees must
now select one of the presumptive compliance minimums.2 14 If community need
is insufficient to meet either percentage minimum, or if a hospital is financially
incapable of delivering enough uncompensated care to meet its selected
minimum, the deficits, compounded by an interest factor, carry over to future
fiscal years, and act to extend the compliance period. In addition, hospitals
claiming insufficient community need must institute affirmative action plans to
seek out eligible patients.2 Both changes impose an unexpected burden on
261. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(b)-(d) (1979). DHEW has explained that this change was
instituted so that the time limitation could not be used to ' 'forgive'" noncompliance
during the obligation period. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,382 (Appendix I to final regulations
of May 18, 1979).
262. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(b)-(d) (1979). Deficits and excesses are carried forward with
the addition of an inflation factor by which the deficit or excess to be applied to the total
volume figure is adjusted by the percentage change in the national Consumer Price Index
for medical care. Id. § 124.503(d). The new concept of "buying out" of the uncompensated
care obligation through an increased volume of annual care leads to the question whether
a hospital could "buy out" by refinancing its Hill-Burton grant or loan through a private
lender and repaying the government. In many instances, this course of action would be
cheaper for a hospital than compliance with the new regulations. DHEW has indicated
that it will not allow hospitals this option. Meeting of DHEW Representatives and Staff of
Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission (Nov. 6, 1979) (notes on file at
Maryland Law Review). Even if hospitals were permitted to "buy out" of the uncompensated care obligation, it would seem that the community service obligation would continue
to apply given that those requirements extend to any hospital that has ever received Title
VI funding. See note 259 and accompanying text supra.
263. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.503. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,387 (Appendix I to final
regulations of May 18, 1979). Under the waiver provision of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2)
(1976), hospitals that are not capable financially of providing uncompensated care may be
exempted from compliance.
264. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a) (1979).
265. Id. § 124.504. DHEW suggests that such plans might include newspaper, radio,
and television announcements of the availability of uncompensated care, notice to
community groups, expansion of the hospital's service area, voluntary referral arrangements with other hospitals, and expansion of the types of services and income levels of
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hospitals, and the waiver elimination also violates the terms of the statute
under which these hospitals received funds.
The methods adopted by the 1979 regulations to compute the ten percent of
grants presumptive compliance option have also expanded Hill-Burton obligations beyond their original terms. First, the definition of the term "grants" has
been expanded to include federal assistance provided through programs that
were supplemental to Hill-Burton.' Second, the ten percent of grants figure is
no longer calculated solely from the dollar amount of assistance received in past
years, but is adjusted upward annually by the percentage change in the national
Consumer Price Index for medical care.' Unlike debts or mortgages, then, the
amount owed by Hill-Burton hospitals under the ten percent option will be
adjusted upward each year. By precluding hospitals from basing their uncompensated care obligation on pre-inflationary dollars, this change places the ten
percent option on similar footing with the three percent of annual operating
costs option, which is calculated in current dollars under both the 1972 and 1979
regulations.' This new inflation factor will, by DHEW's estimate, result in
major increases in the amount of uncompensated care over that due from
Hill-Burton hospitals under the previous regulations. The agency estimates that
the inflation factor alone will result in an additional $39 million in Hill-Burton
care in 1980 and $217 million in 1984.269 In addition, the national Consumer
Price Index medical care inflation rate is an inequitable inflation measurement.
First, the medical care index includes many components, such as proprietary
drugs, which have nothing to do with the inflation of hospital costs.

270

Second,

patients served under its Hill-Burton plan. The Secretary has authority to change the plan
and to require its continuance until the annual compliance level is reached in a fiscal year.
Obviously, the facility must bear these affirmative action expenses.
266. Id. § 124.502. The Appalachian Development Act of 1965, 40 U.S.C. app. § 1-423
(1976), is one of four programs considered to be supplemental to Hill-Burton because
hospitals receiving monies under these programs gave assurances similar to the
uncompensated care and community services provisions. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372,
29,383 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
267. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)(ii).
268. Although the 3% of operating costs option may have been cheaper originally for
some hospitals than the 10% of grants option, the inflation in medical care costs over time
made the 10% option cheaper in almost all cases. That is, hospital operating costs have
obviously been tied to inflation, while the 10% of grants option, until the 1979 change, was
based on the size of the loan.
269. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,403 (Appendix II to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
This estimate covers all Hill-Burton facilities, including nursing homes and out-patient
facilities. DHEW provides no separate figures for in-patient hospitals, the group that
received the great majority of Hill-Burton money. See HILL-BURTON
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supra note 38, at 2-4. The American Hospital Association notes that by 1984, the
inflation factor alone will amount to almost one-half of the present total compliance level
of all Hill-Burton assisted facilities and cites the case of one hospital that will be required
in 1984 to provide uncompensated care in an amount almost equal to the amount of its
original grant. See Brief for Appellant, American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, No. 79-2162 (7th
Cir., filed Oct. 11, 1979), at 15-16 [hereinafter cited as AHA Circuit Court Brie/].
270. Other examples include vitamins, cough syrup, dentists' fees, eyeglass dispensing.
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 1978, at 421-24 (1979).
REPORT,
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the application of a national average inflation rate penalizes hospitals that have
succeeded in controlling costs to achieve an inflation rate lower than the
national average and rewards facilities that have made no attempts to control
skyrocketing hospital costs.27 ' Even assuming the legitimacy of the addition of
some inflation factors, more precise measurements exist for equitable calculation of hospital inflation. 2
The notice section of the new uncompensated care regulations now requires
three types of notice: public, in-facility, and individual. 73 Public notice through
newspaper announcement is now to be coordinated with a hospital's local Health
Systems Agency, a federally-created planning body.27' In-facility notices, which
are supplied by DHEW, are required in specific locations of the hospital.275 The
individual notice requirement makes the most sweeping notice change, in that
Hill-Burton facilities must now provide individual written notice to every person
who seeks services and must make reasonable efforts to insure that each person
understands the meaning of the notice." Individual notice must be given prior
to treatment except in some types of emergencies277 and must continue to be
supplied until the facility's uncompensated care minimum is fulfilled for the

271. Hospital care expenditures have increased 260% in the past 10 years, an average
of 14% per year or two and one-half times the rate of growth of the Gross National
Product. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 4; Gibson & Fisher, National Health Expenditures,
Fiscal Year 1977, Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, July 1978, at 14, 15. Penalizing cost-conscious
hospitals conflicts directly with other executive branch proposals, which have sought to
limit hospital cost inflation. See President's Message to Congress Proposing Enactment of
Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 603-05 (April 25,
1977).
272. See Biles, Schramm, & Atkinson, Hospital Cost Inflation Under State Rate Setting
Programs: The Record, NEW ENGLAND J. MED. (forthcoming), which presents a state-bystate analysis of hospital cost inflation.
273. 42 C.F.R. § 124.505 (1979).
274. Id. § 124.505(a), (b). Section 1515 of the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2239 (1974), gave DHEW the
authority to designate a Health Systems Agency for health services areas as defined in the
Act. The agencies' primary responsibilities are health planning and development within
their respective areas. See 42 C.F.R. § 122.101.
275. 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c). The posted notice must be multilingual in some instances,
and the facility must make reasonable efforts to communicate its contents to persons who
may reasonably be believed unable to read it.
276. Id. § 124.505(d). The notice must state that the facility is required by law to
provide a reasonable amount of uncompensated services, must set forth patient eligibility
criteria, must announce which hospital services are provided (pursuant to the hospital's
allocation plan), and must state that a written determination will be made of a patient's
eligibility for uncompensated care within two days of a request for services. The American
Hospital Association estimates that distribution of 122 million individual notices will be
required in 1980. See AHA District Court Complaint, supra note 43, at 18.
277. 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(d)(2). Prior notification is required except where the
emergency nature of a case makes it impractical. In this situation, notice is to be supplied
to the next of kin or patient as soon as practical, but in no event at a time later than the
first presentation of the bill for services.
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year. 8 If an applicant is denied uncompensated care, the facility must provide a
written statement of the reasons for denial. This requirement survives
fulfillment of the annual compliance obligation, that is, it must be given when
the reason for denial is that no further obligation exists for the fiscal year.7 9
The individual notice regulation is an outgrowth of the Newsom v.
Vanderbilt University decision; however, although the Newsom court held that
potential beneficiaries were entitled to individual notice,28 the new regulations
require individual notice to every hospital patient, regardless of insurance
coverage or ability to pay." The administrative, printing, and distribution costs
mandated by this requirement are burdensome to hospitals in an absolute
sense;282 moreover, when compared with the actual number of patients who will
be eligible for and receive Hill-Burton care, individual notice is an extremely
cost-inefficient means of delivering care to the needy.
In conjunction with the individual notice requirement, the 1979 regulations
add new standards for patient eligibility determination. A hospital must now
make a determination "on request" by the patient; eligibility must not
necessarily be made prior to treatment as required under the previous
regulations.283 The criteria for patient eligibility for Hill-Burton care are also
278. Id. § 124.505(d)(1). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,390 (Appendix I to final
regulations of May 18, 1979).
279. 42 C.F.R. § 124.508(c).
280. 453 F. Supp. 401, 423 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
281. DHEW's position appears to be that all patients are potential beneficiaries,
regardless of apparent ability to pay or third-party insurance coverage, because
subsequent financial reversals may entitle them to apply for Hill-Burton benefits even
after receiving treatment. See text accompanying note 283 infra. The new regulations do
not, however, adopt the appeal and review procedures found to be required by the Newsom
court. 453 F. Supp. at 424. In contrast to its acquiescence in other federal district court
rulings, DHEW did not implement this requirement because "the governing statute does
not require facilities to establish review procedures." 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,393
(Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
282. DHEW's cost estimate for all facilities' administration of the combined notice
requirements is approximately $58 million per year. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 20,406,
Table 4 (Appendix II to final regulations of May 18, 1979). This figure does not include
compliance costs other than administrative ones, such as the cost of printing approximately 122 million individual notices and legal expenses related to Hill-Burton claims. DHEW
estimates that its own administrative costs in 1980 will be approximately $1.5 million. 44
Fed. Reg. 29,400.
283. 42 C.F.R. § 124.508. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,392-93 (Appendix I to final
regulations of May 18, 1979). The prior determination of eligibility requirement was
adopted by DHEW in response to Corum H. See text accompanying note 151 supra. The
change in this provision appears to reflect DHEW's understanding that prior determination is not always feasible or fair to otherwise eligible patients who did not seek eligibility
determinations. Theoretically, this change comports with a more equitable distribution
system; practically, however, it acts to expand the class of potential applicants for a finite
amount of care. Under the new regulations, an application for Hill-Burton care could be
considered by the hospital even after its institution of a collection suit against the patient.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,393 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
Arguably, this raises the possibility that hospital noncompliance may be raised as a
defense in a collection action. 42 C.F.R. § 124.507. See note 328 and accompanying text
infra.
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changed. Under prior regulations, these standards were set by each state
Hill-Burton agency;28' now, hospitals must use a uniform income standard.2 5 The
use of a national standard does not account for regional variations in income or
medical costs;28 furthermore, the standard is based solely on income; other
factors that might influence a patient's ability to pay are not considered." 7 In
addition, the regulation creates an upper "cap" on patient eligibility; thus, a
patient with an income just above the eligibility limit may no longer qualify for
Hill-Burton care even after exhausting his savings.2"
Pursuant to guidelines included in the regulations, a facility must
formulate a plan for distributing care among eligible patients and must also
specify which services will be offered and how they will be spread over the year.
A hospital still has discretion in selecting the services that it will provide to
meet its obligations, and, as under the prior regulations, an indigent in need of a
specific medical service remains at the mercy of pre-set determinations as to
whether such services will be offered under the hospital's plan. The uncompensated care regulations now require, however, that a hospital's plan take into
account its local Health Systems Agency's comments on community need.2 "
Although the reasonable cost calculation and crediting methods of previous
regulations are continued in the new regulations, certain expenses and types of
services that were creditable under the previous regulations are now excluded.
The new provision forces a hospital either to refuse to supply such nonqualifying

284. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
285. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.506. The standard is taken from the Community Service
Administration's (CSA) poverty income criteria. Two categories of patient eligibility are
set: Category A includes persons with incomes below the CSA poverty income guideline;
Category B includes persons with incomes above the guideline, but not more than twice
that figure. A hospital's plan may provide for services to both groups, but if Category B
patients are to be Hill-Burton eligible, the plan must specify whether such persons will
receive free or reduced charge services and, if the latter, the method for determining the
reduced charge. See id. § 124.507(a)(4).
286. In the public comment on the uniform standard, it was pointed out that the
Medicare and Medicaid systems recognize regional variations in these factors. Nonetheless, DHEW retained the uniform standard on the ground of its administrative simplicity.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,390-91 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
287. Such factors might include other assets (e.g., property, securities) or other sources
of funds (e.g., savings). See id.
288. In addition, another component of the eligibility regulation may pose administrative problems for hospitals. Many persons defined as Hill-Burton eligible by the new
income standards are also Medicaid eligible, yet the regulations prohibit a hospital from
claiming Hill-Burton credit for care given to any person who is eligible for any third party
or government insurance program, regardless of the person's actual enrollment in such a
program. A hospital may credit services rendered to such a patient only if he refuses to
take necessary action to obtain entitlement to benefits. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.509(a); 44 Fed.
Reg. 29,372, 29,393-94 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979). This
requirement is consistent with Hill-Burton's policy of being a program of "last resort," see
44 Fed. Reg. at 29,393-94; however, it may involve hospitals in administrative conflicts
over eligibility and crediting.
289. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.507.
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charity services or to bear the expense without receiving Hill-Burton credit. In
some instances, the provision will disrupt comprehensive programs of care for
the needy and force those patients into the hospital's Hill-Burton plan, which
may not offer full services.m
These intricate new regulations spring, ostensibly, from the Hill-Burton
Act's requirement that there be "made available . . .a reasonable volume of
hospital services to persons unable to pay therefor. ' ' "l Overall, the new
uncompensated care regulations are a strange mix of overly broad categorizations - such as the uniform inflation rate and income eligibility standard when such is deemed efficient for DHEW administration, and overly specific
requirements - such as individual notice to every person seeking hospital
treatment - when the agency sees fit to impose such requirements. They go
beyond the terms of past regulations to place a heavier financial burden on
Hill-Burton hospitals, both in real dollars for actual uncompensated care
dispensed, ' 9' and in administrative costs for compliance. 3 Yet, they do little to
further any comprehensive policy for improved health care to the poor.
B.

The 1979 Community Service Regulations

Like the uncompensated care regulations, the new community service
requirements reflect DHEW initiative and also manifest the influence of various
federal courts. Cook II and Cook III held, respectively, that the original
Hill-Burton Act compelled grantee hospitals' acceptance of Medicaid patients
under the community service clause' and did not permit the time limitation on
the requirement. 5 These interpretations have been maintained and expanded in
the 1979 community service regulations,m which require hospitals to institute

290. See id. § 124.509. One such requirement excludes from allowable credit any
amount in excess of the payment that a facility has agreed to accept from any other
reimbursement program. Id. § 124.509(b). This limitation is reduced to meaning by the
objection of a particular hospital to the provision when the regulations were in proposed
form: The hospital maintained a reimbursement agreement with a locally funded medical
program for indigents under which it was paid approximately one-quarter of the average
cost of the services provided. Under the old regulations, the hospital was permitted to
charge against its Hill-Burton obligation the difference between the lower local
reimbursement rate and the higher rate of Medicaid reimbursement; however, under the
new regulations, this credit is not permitted. As noted by the hospital, the new regulation
called into question the financial advisability of continuing the local program. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 29,372, 29,393 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1976). For example, DHEW explains its expansion of the
grant base to include supplemental programs, see note 266 and accompanying text supra,
by stating that "the Secretary is clearly authorized to define what is a 'reasonable volume'
of services." 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,384 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
292. See note 269 and accompanying text supra.
293. See note 282 supra.
294. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook I), 61 F.R.D. 354, 360 (E.D. La. 1972).
295. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. (Cook III), Civ. No. 70-1969 (E.D. La. March
12, 1975).
296. 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.601, .603 (1979).
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new operating policies and administrative procedures. Unlike the uncompensated care regulations, which deal with delivery of services to persons who are
not Medicare or Medicaid eligible, the new community service regulations focus
on these programs and, in effect, operate as adjunct regulations in DHEW's
administration of Medicare and Medicaid.
For example, in order to improve Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries'
access to Hill-Burton hospitals, the community service requirement now
prohibits facilities from maintaining admissions policies whereby a patient must
be referred by a physician with staff privileges. If such a policy has the "effect of
excluding persons who reside in the area because they do not have a private
family doctor," the facility must make alternate arrangements for admission. 97
In addition, if Medicaid patients are accepted by an inadequate number of
staff-privileged physicians in the hospital or any of its departments, and this
practice has the effect of excluding Medicaid patients from the facility or any of
its services, the facility is deemed out of compliance and must take steps to
ensure full access to all services by Medicaid patients."8 DHEW suggests that
these defects in admissions policies may be remedied by allowing physicians
without staff privileges to treat their patients in the facility, obtaining the
voluntary agreement of staff-privileged physicians to accept referrals of such
patients, requiring staff-privileged physicians to treat such patients as a
condition to obtaining or renewing their privileges, establishing new clinics
through which such patients may be treated or admitted, or hiring new
physicians to treat patients who have no private physicians."
The original purpose of Hill-Burton's community service clause was to
prohibit racial discrimination and to prevent the monopoly of governmentfunded hospitals by special interests."° These new requirements completely
transform this purpose. Although the goal of complete access to hospital services
by Medicaid patients and other persons unable to pay for services is laudable,
the use of the Hill-Burton regulations as a device to achieve it is an
inappropriate "back door" approach to a serious health care issue. Such an
approach ignores the real problems inherent in medical care to the poor and
shifts the entire burden of a new health care initiative to hospitals that once
received Hill-Burton funds and their privately insured and cash-paying
patients." '
In addition to transforming Hill-Burton's original purpose, the new
regulations complicate some elements of hospitals' operating procedures. Some

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. § 124.603(d)(1).
Id. § 124.603(d)(2).
Id. § 124.603(i)-(v).
See notes 22 to 28 and accompanying text supra.
Although it may be argued that physician discretion to treat patients based on

ability to pay or reimbursement constitutes a fundamental inequity in the health care
system, the fact remains that such practices do exist. Restructuring the health care system
to eliminate these and other inequities requires a comprehensive approach, not one
accomplished by fiat and imposed on selected hospitals.
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of the new requirements conflict with the accreditation and licensure requirements for many hospitals and raise questions of hospital liability for the acts of
physicians practicing within the facility.3"2 Also, an ambiguity is created by
provisions that limit the circumstances in which hospitals may collect preadmission deposits. If this practice has the effect of denying or delaying
admission because of inability to pay, it is a violation of the community service
regulations. The policy, however, is not limited to patients who are Hill-Burton,
Medicaid, or Medicare eligible, but includes "employed persons and persons with
other collateral [who] do not have savings" or other available cash at the time
that services are requested, but who "probably can pay for services. ''30, This
portion of the regulations leaves uncertainty as to the circumstances in which
preadmission deposits may be collected, and has caused concern among hospitals
3 °
that rely on such funds to maintain cash flow and reduce bad debt.
Implementation of this broadly phrased requirement furthers the notion that
the Hill-Burton Act may be expanded to regulate any hospital practice that
touches upon any facet of hospital care."
Finally, the community service regulations prohibit denial of emergency
services to any resident of a facility's service area because of the patient's
inability to pay."c This requirement, per se, does not impose a major new burden
on Hill-Burton hospitals, most of which have treated all emergency cases
regardless of ability to pay2 7 Rather, the requirement is another instance of
overreaching the limits of the Hill-Burton Act. In this respect, the provision is
much like the community services provision requiring that hospitals participate
in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Most hospitals would participate in
these programs regardless of the Hill-Burton requirement, 0° and objections to
302. See AHA Circuit Court Brief, supra note 269, at 21 & 22.
303. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(3).
304. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,398 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979);
AHA Circuit Court Brief, supra note 269, at 33.
305. This requirement also ignores the ruling in Cloud v. Regenstein, No. C 77-599A
(N.D. Ga. April 29, 1977) (denial of plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction and class
certification), that the Hill-Burton Act was not intended to control such administrative
functions. This suit has been reactivated since the 1979 regulations became effective.
306. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(b). This requirement extends beyond the point at which a
facility has fulfilled its annual obligation, although such service may be credited toward
the Hill-Burton obligation throughout the year. The facility must continue treatment until
the medical judgment is made that transfer or discharge would not be detrimental.
307. Even apart from hospitals' independent action in this regard, many states and
localities have laws that compel hospitals to treat all emergency cases. See 44 Fed. Reg.
29,372, 29,393 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 19791.
308. Cf. note 57 supra (Medicare and Medicaid represent 35% of hospital revenues).
For many hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid are major funding sources; program
participation is necessary for financial survival. For example, The Johns Hopkins Hospital
derives 47% of annual revenues from the programs, see TilE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL,
1979 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1979); the Greater Baltimore Medical Center derives 36r of
annual revenues from Medicare and Medicaid. Conversation with S. Erdman, Comptroller,
Greater Baltimore Medical Center (March 3, 1980).
In the past, however, it has not been the case that every service in a participating
hospital would necessarily be available to such patients. Availability of a particular
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the requirement go much less to its substance than to the broad scope of power
that DHEW has now claimed under the Act. These detailed changes in the
community service regulations, which have evolved from the general statutory
requirement that Hill-Burton hospitals should "be made available to all persons
residing in the territorial area,"' have been promulgated in disregard of the
Act's specific prohibition of federal interference with the operation or administration of recipient hospitals. 10
It may be that the 1979 regulations are DHEW's atonement for its lack of
responsiveness and enforcement from 1972 to 1978. In this regard, the new
regulations have been accompanied by indications of DHEW's intent to provide
"more vigorous enforcement" of the requirements."' The problem, however, is
that DHEW has shifted the burden of reparation to Hill-Burton hospitals in

service has generally turned upon the willingness of individual physicians on a service to
accept government payment for their services. See Perry v. Cape Cod Hosp., Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Health (March 14, 1979), an administrative ruling that determined that Massachusetts Hill-Burton hospitals could not comply with the previous community service
requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(e) (1978), "merely by participating in the Medicaid
program." The Department concluded that access to certain services was unlawfully
limited because no physicians on the services accepted Medicaid patients. Id. at 5; see also
HEALTH LAW NEWSLETTER, No. 96 (April 1979), at 1-2. It appears that the language of the
new community service requirement was modeled after the conclusion reached in this
case. Letter from Holly D. Ladd, Director, Mass. Hill-Burton Program, to author (Nov. 26,
1979) (on file with MarylandLaw Review).
309. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1976).
310. Id. § 291m. The section provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to exercise any
supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance or operation of
any facility with respect to which any funds have been or may be expended under this
subchapter.
This section was discussed in Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972). See note
64 supra. The provision is repeated in the 1975 Title XVI enactment. 42 U.S.C. § 300s-2
(1976).
311. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,396 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979);
see also id. at 29,383, 29,400, 29,401. This attitude was expressed at a meeting attended by
the author between representatives of DHEW Region III divisions (Public Health Service,
Office of the General Counsel, Health Resources Administration, Health Care Financing
Administration) and the staff of Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission to
discuss the impact of the new regulations on Maryland hospitals (Nov. 6, 1979) (notes on
file at Maryland Law Review).
The regulations include reporting and record maintenance requirements and
investigation and enforcement provisions that comport with the substantive requirements
of the regulations. 42 C.F.R. 99 124.510, .511. These provisions eliminate the authority
previously vested in the state Hill-Burton agencies and, in accordance with the terms of
Title XVI, acknowledge DHEW as the primary monitoring and enforcement agency.
Compare 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719, 14,720 (binding interim regulations of July 22, 1972,
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978)) with 42 C.F.R. §§ 124.510, .511 (1979). See text
accompanying notes 160 & 162 supra. DHEW may, however, at its discretion, enter into
agreements with state agencies to obtain their administrative assistance. 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.512 (1979).
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disregard of the regulations' impact on these facilities as compared with the
actual improvement in the delivery of health care to the indigent. The agency
has also continued its myopic regulation of Hill-Burton without consideration of
other health care programs under its aegis.
PART III: THE FALLACY OF HILL-BURTON FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

The American Hospital Association is seeking invalidation of the 1979
regulations," 2 basing its claims on impairment of contract, taking of Hill-Burton
hospitals' property without due process,313 and an overreaching of regulatory
authority"4 on the government's redefinition of the contractual terms under
which hospitals accepted Hill-Burton funding, the requirement of major
expenditures by at least some Hill-Burton hospitals, and the fact that the
detailed new requirements exceed and even conflict with statutory authority. It
is interesting that these issues are presented for judicial resolution, in that
partial responsibility for the regulations' evolution to this stage can be traced to
the alteration of the Act's scope resulting from some courts' misinterpretations

312. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, No. 79-2162 (7th Cir., filed October 11, 1979).
The AHA has appealed the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction of the 1979
regulations, 477 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1979), wherein the court applied the weighing of
hardships test and found:
The Regulations at issue, and the relevant enabling statutes . . . were developed to
provide the poor with greater access to hospital care . ... To deny such poor
individuals access to the hospital care they require. . . would be to impose upon them
a hardship that is far greater than any of the AHA's member organizations will have
to endure.
Id. at 668. The district court followed in the footsteps of previous courts in finding that the
Act's purpose was to provide hospital care to the poor, and thus erred by balancing that
interest against the hospitals' hardships. Instead, the proper comparison would have been
to weigh the effects of the old regulatory scheme against the effects of the new regulatory
scheme on Hill-Burton hospitals.
313. AHA Circuit Court Brief, supra note 269, at 13-30. In its contract impairment
and taking claims, the AHA relies on the line of Supreme Court cases that have stated
that abrogation of a contract by the United States may be a violation of the fifth
amendment's due process clause. AHA CircuitCourt Brief,supra note 216, at 27-28 (citing
inter alia, Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)). The fifth amendment states:
"No persons shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. It has been held to protect private contracts from federal government
impairment and to restrain the federal government from abrogating contracts to which it
is a party in much the same manner that the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
prohibits the states from impairing or abrogating contracts. See generally Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692
(1960). For an excellent treatment of the impairment of contract issue as it relates to the
1979 Hill-Burton regulations, seeHill-BurtonFacilities, siupra note 22.
314. In its agency overreaching claim, the AHA has focused on the principle that

administration of a federal statute is intended to effectuate, not amplify or alter, the will
of Congress. See AHA Circuit Court Brief, supra note 296, at 23-24 (citing, inter alia,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1975)).
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of Hill-Burton's purpose. In its consideration of the AHA claim, the circuit court
would do well to ignore the misperception of Hill-Burton that has arisen through
litigation and to take a fresh look at the Act's purpose and the development of
-the regulations.
As has been discussed, because the courts have been compelled to consider
Hill-Burton in isolation from broader health policy concerns, the program has
not grown in any coordinated fashion. In American Hospital Association v.
Harris, the court, like its predecessors, is limited to consideration of legal issues
and cannot address the policy problems inherent in the new regulations. Many
of these problems extend well beyond the specific regulatory provisions to
concern the effect of the entire Hill-Burton program.
The result of Hill-Burton's unplanned development from a hospital construction and modernization program into a service-provision program is the
delivery of a small amount of service to the indigent through a cumbersome
administrative system. The program is highly cost-efficient: In 1980 DHEW
estimates that somewhat less than $395 million in Hill-Burton care will be
delivered through the uncompensated care requirement, and an additional $59.5
million will be spent to administer the program. 15 This represents a ratio of 6.6 :
1, Hill-Burton care delivered to administrative costs. In contrast, Medicare and
Medicaid benefits exceeded $41 billion in 1978, the last year for which published
figures are available, and administrative expenses totaled $2 billion." Under
Medicare and Medicaid, then, the ratio of care delivered to administrative
expenses is approximately 20.5 : 1. Not only do the relative dollar values of care
delivered show Hill-Burton to be an inadequate step toward more comprehensive financing of health care for the poor, but the high administrative costs
associated with the program illustrate its inefficiencies. "
Furthermore, under the regulations whether any individual indigent will
actually receive Hill-Burton hospital care is highly uncertain. The delivery of

315. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,399 (Appendix II to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
The $395 estimate is based on the assumption that all Title VI facilities still falling within
the time limitation, including out-patient facilities and nursing homes, will elect the 10%
compliance option. Costs to hospitals, which received 83% of all Hill-Burton funds, are not
estimated separately. Id. at n.3. In fact, as DHEW points out, some facilities may elect the
3% of operating costs option because it will be cheaper; thus, the value of care delivered
will be less than $395 million. Id.
DHEW estimates that of the $59.5 million administrative costs for 1980, $58
million will be borne by Hill-Burton institutions. This estimate does not include some
administrative elements of compliance. See note 282 supra.
316. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 29 (Table 6). Given that 1978 expenditures increased
approximately 13% over 1977 expenditures, see id. at 1, 10, and that health care inflation
has continued at about that same rate since 1978, it may be assumed that the 1980 figure
would, in fact, be larger.
317. Promulgation of the regulations thus conflicts with other government initiatives
to decrease regulatory costs. See note 271 supra; DeMuth, ConstrainingRegulator Costs
- The White House Programs (pt. 1), 3 REGUL.ATION, Jan./Feb. 1980, at 13-26.
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care is dependent upon a number of factors totally unrelated to his need for
medical care for which he cannot pay, such as
(1) residence (Does he live near a hospital that once received Hill-Burton
funds?);
(2) the year in which the facility received the grant (Has the uncompensated care obligation expired?);
(3) the size of the hospital's operating budget or Hill-Burton grant (What
is the extent of the obligation?);
(4) the hospital's financial condition (Does the hospital have a diminished
obligation because of deferral to a future year?);
(5) the time of the year (Has the hospital already met its annual quota?);
(6) the medical service needed (Does the hospital's plan offer such a
service?);
(7) the income level in the area (Have other needy persons already
consumed the available uncompensated care?);
(8) the patient's income level (Does he meet the income standards? How
does the hospital's plan divide care among the various classes of eligible
patients?).318
A further anomaly with respect to patient care is seen in the manner in
which the community service regulations arbitrarily differentiate between
Hill-Burton patients and Medicare or Medicaid patients. As noted above,
Hill-Burton patients have access to only those services offered in the hospital's
distribution plan, and must be served only so long as the hospital retains a
balance on its annual obligation. In contrast, Medicare and Medicaid patients
are eligible for all Hill-Burton hospital services at any time."' Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries may not be able to receive care, however, if they do not
have access to a hospital that once received Hill-Burton funds, since only
Hill-Burton hospitals are required to institute new procedures to ensure full
access to Medicare and Medicaid patients.3" Forcing selected hospitals to incur
the expenses of hiring new staff and maintaining new clinics under the
authority of the community service regulations is one issue; another is the
rationality of differentiating among Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries on the
basis of Hill-Burton funding of their area hospital.
In terms of patient care distributed, another irony is found in DHEW's cost
analysis of the new uncompensated care regulations, which states that one
major effect of the requirements will be to redistribute among hospitals the
existing financial burden of charity care.3"' The requirements will trigger a
reduction in the charity care volume of some non-Hill-Burton hospitals and an
increase for some Hill-Burton hospitals. Thus, a large part of the additional care
delivered through Hill-Burton hospitals will not represent an increase in the

318.
319.
320.
321.

See
See
See
See

generally 42 C.F.R. § 124.501-.509 (1979).
id. § 124.603.
note 308 and accompanying text supra.
44 Fed. Reg. 29,409 (Appendix II to final regulations of May 18, 1979).
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total amount of care available to indigents, but will merely offset decreases in
availability and demand in non-Hill-Burton facilities." This assessment undercuts one major rationale of the new regulations, that poor people were receiving inadequate hospital care under the old regulations.
Moreover, uncertainty about how redistribution will occur is one factor that
makes it difficult to ascertain the real impact of the new regulations on
individual Hill-Burton hospitals. DHEW's acceptance of this phenomenon
glosses over the fact that Hill-Burton care is not funded by any public taxation
system. If redistribution results in an increased uncompensated care obligation
for a particular Hill-Burton hospital, then its charge-paying patients will bear
the increased hospital charges made to support the additional care. 23 This is

322. A non-Hill-Burton hospital may reduce its charity care volume and refer patients
to a Hill-Burton facility. Poor people may thus continue to receive care, but simply in a
different location. Or, a non-Hill-Burton hospital may experience a decrease in demand for
charity care as a nearby Hill-Burton hospital provides adequate services to meet
community need. In fact, a more logical approach would look not to the location in which
the poor receive health care, but to whether it is being received. Instead, the redistribution
concept perpetuates the quid pro quo theory of Hill-Burton, see text accompanying notes
101 to 103 supra, and focuses on hospitals' obligations rather than on the need for services.
In turn, this focus recalls the issue of contract impairment. See note 313 supra.
323. DHEW is not unmindful of this consequence. In its cost analysis, the agency
states that most of the redistribution will involve a "shift to increased charges" to
cash-paying patients, privately insured patients, and philanthropy. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372,
29,409 (Appendix II to final regulations of May 18, 1979). By philanthropy, it appears that
DHEW means contributions to hospital endowments or general funds, as charitable
reimbursement for specific patient services may not be credited toward the Hill-Burton
obligation. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.509 (1979).
The agency's continued insistence that Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
will not share in funding Hill-Burton care is seen in its response to actions that have
sought such coverage. The DHEW Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), the
adjudicatory body created by statute to hear cost reimbursement cases involving at least
$10,000, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1976), has found that Hill-Burton uncompensated care is
not an "allowable cost" under the Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(i) (1976),
which provides that hospital costs incurred with respect to individuals who are not
Medicare beneficiaries shall not be borne by the program. See, e.g., Indiana Hosp. Ass'n
Group Appeal No. 1. v. Blue Cross Ass'n/Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., Health Care Financing
Administration, Administrator's Decision, [1980] 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
30,333, affg in part PRRB Dec. No. 79-D95, [1979-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 30,163. See also Rapides General Hosp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp.
384, 387-89 (W.D. La. 1977), which granted summary judgment to the plaintiff hospital
on its appeal of the PRRB's decision, PRRB Dec. No. 76-D3, [1976 Transfer Binder]
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 27,721, that had denied Medicare reimbursement to
share in the cost of Hill-Burton care. The court found that the cost of providing
Hill-Burton uncompensated care, which was incurred because the hospital accepted
government funds for construction, was analogous to interest payments on a privatelyfinanced capital construction project. Since Medicare pays its share of the latter expense,
the court reasoned, it should also pay its share of Hill-Burton uncompensated care. 435 F.
Supp. at 387-89. See note 56 and accompanying text supra. Rapides was appealed by
DHEW, but on remand to the district court for further fact-finding, was dismissed because
of errors in the plaintiff hospital's cost reports. Conversation with P. Hofstra, Counsel,
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particularly unfair to citizens in localities that operate public hospitals to care
for the needy. These citizens will pay twice for care for the indigent, once
through their taxes to operate the public hospital, and again through higher
rates to finance the required volume of uncompensated care at the private
hospital. In some instances, the public hospital may remain underutilized while
the private hospital is forced to deliver care to its mandatory minimum.
Hill-Burton hospitals in poorer areas, where a large portion of the patient
population are Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries, will also be hard pressed to
pass the entire burden of uncompensated care along to a small percentage of
charge-paying patients. In these and other instances, imposing this subsidization of services on persons whose local hospital happened at one time to have
accepted Hill-Burton funds is fundamentally unfair and illogical.
In some states, hospitals seeking to increase rates must gain permission of
regulatory authorities that control hospital costs. 24 Under some state regulatory
mechanisms, rate increases may not be permitted in order to fund increased
charity care.3 " Thus, some hospitals may be forced to meet increased costs by
resorting to endowments, or reducing the current quality of services in order to
economize.
For other Hill-Burton hospitals, the major effect of the new uncompensated
care regulations may be to alter hospital administrative procedures, not to
increase the volume of uncompensated care dispensed. It appears that a number
of, Hill-Burton hospitals currently provide sufficient charity care to meet their
obligations under the new regulations;326 they have not, however, been
distributing it in accordance with the specific methods detailed by the 1979
regulations. In such instances, the new regulations provide hospitals with an
incentive to classify all eligible Hill-Burton patients in order to obtain program
credit, thus prompting increased administrative expenses with no concommitant
increase in care.
American Hospital Association, April 25, 1980. Litigation on the reimbursement issue is
pending in at least three district courts. Memorial Hosp. v. Harris, No. 80-67-ORL-Civ.-Y
(M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 11, 1980); St. James Hosp. v. Harris, Civ. No. 80C-0735 (N.D. Ill.,
filed Feb. 11, 1980); Miami Valley Hosp. v. Harris, Civ. No. C-2-80-95 (S.D. Ohio, filed
Feb. 8, 1980).
324. There are approximately 25 state rate-setting programs now in operation.
Authority over hospital costs varies from mandatory compliance to advisory budget
review. Biles, Schramm & Atkinson, supra note 272. In Maryland, where mandatory rate
setting is accomplished by a state commission, hospitals must be granted approval prior to
any rate increase. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 568H-Z (1980).
325. See AHA Circuit Court Brief, supra note 269, at 35-36 (Minnesota rate review
system does not allow hospitals to increase rates to charge-paying patients to cover an
increased charity care obligation of the volume demanded by the new Hill-Burton
regulations).
326. According to a preliminary analysis, this appears to be the case for all Maryland
Hill-Burton hospitals. Added costs to these facilities will be incurred for administration of
the requirements. See HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMM'N, FINANCIAL ACCESS
EXPERIMENT (DRAFT) 5 (1980). To date, three Maryland hospitals have been granted rate
increases to meet these added administrative costs. Interview with Dr. Harold A. Cohen,
Executive Director, Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission, March 11, 1980.
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In other instances, the major effect of the uncompensated care regulations
may be the redistribution of a hospital's fixed amount of charity care among its
own needy patients. Patients who would previously have been Hill-Burton
eligible may not meet the new income requirements, and care may be
redistributed from the "less" needy to those deemed by the eligibility standards
to be "more" needy. Alternately, because eligibility is based only on income, and
does not consider assets, some patients who could afford at least partial payment
3 27
may receive free Hill-Burton care.
Finally, the growth of Hill-Burton into a service-provision program may
have other less obvious consequences for recipient hospitals. For example,
DHEW's interpretation of the new regulations suggests that Hill-Burton
compliance may now be considered a proper affirmative defense to a hospital
collection suit. 32 The interjection of compliance has the potential to call into
question such items as the hospital's calculations of its available volume of care,
its plan for allocation of services throughout the facility, notice to patients, or
eligibility determination methods, and could complicate such proceedings to the
point of forcing hospitals to abandon or compromise otherwise rightful claims for
payment. Another potential problem is raised by the use of Hill-Burton as a
basis for medical malpractice claims in which a plaintiff alleges that proper
medical treatment was not received because of a hospital's violation of some
facet of the regulations. 329 Again, linking Hill-Burton to the already complex
factual issues of medical malpractice would involve the courts in compliance
determinations that could complicate and expand such litigation. To assume
that such actions are a natural outgrowth of a hospital construction and
modernization statute is to strain credulity.
CONCLUSION

Examination of the results and potential outcomes of the original HillBurton Act as interpreted through the 1979 regulations shows the program to
have grown into a cumbersome and inefficient device for the delivery of a small

327. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.506 (1979); notes 283 to 288 and accompanying text supra.
328. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372, 29,393 (Appendix I to final regulations of May 18, 1979)
(explains that new regulations, unlike previous ones, do not require determination of
patient eligibility prior to service). The explanation reads: "Under [the regulations], the
timing of the determination depends solely upon when the request for uncompensated
services is made. The determination may be made after services (or even after institution
of suit), if that is when the request is made." Prior to the 1979 regulations, two state court
decisions had found that the Act and regulations did not imply that an individual had a
right to raise hospital noncompliance as a defense to a collection action. See Yale-New
Haven Hosp. v. Matthews, 32 Conn. Supp. 539, 343 A.2d 661 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1024 (1975); Valley Credit Serv., Inc. v. Mair, 35 Or. App. 637, 582 P.2d 47 (1978). It
remains to be seen whether DHEW's interpretation of the new requirement means that
this affirmative defense would now be accepted.
329. See Roth, Hill-Burton: A Basis for Medical Malpractice Litigation?, HosPrrAl. LAW
MANUAi., No. 82 (Dec. 1979), at 7-8.
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and uncertain amount of medical care to an arbitrarily designated group of
indigents. To accomplish this end, the program imposes inequitable financial
and administrative burdens and potential liabilities on recipient hospitals. Most
of these issues are not justiciable; thus, at this point, it is left to Congress to
recognize that Hill-Burton has grown apart from any sensible or equitable
strategy to improve health care to the poor.
A comprehensive approach is needed in order to attain the goal of adequate
health care for all Americans regardless of ability to pay. Hill-Burton is not
remotely capable of being a vehicle by which to work toward this end; in fact,
the apparent inequities, costliness, and bureaucratic requirements associated
with the program only serve to diminish confidence in the government's ability
to manage adequate and workable health care programs. Congress should repeal
the Hill-Burton Act and take an overall approach to these issues through the
expansion and improvement of Medicare and Medicaid or the enactment of a
national health insurance program.

